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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 459, IUE
OPINION AND AWARD
and
A. B. Dick Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the thirty working days suspension effective January 28,
1980 of Anthony Terranova? If not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 2, 1980 at which time Mr. Terranova,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievant was suspended for absenteeism.
The record before me shows, without refutation, that the
grievant was warned in 1975 about his absences; was absent due
to claimed sickness eighteen and one-half days in 1976, twentyfour and one-half days in 1977, sixteen and one-half days in 1978
and thirty days in 1979.

He was warned verbally at meetings or

in writing about his absences on September 22, 1977 and November
9, 1978.

At other times he was informed that he would have to

submit medical substantiation of his claimed illnesses during
certain periods that he was absent.

The instant disciplinary

suspension took the form of a written notice dated January 24,
1980, effective January 28, 1980.
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The evidence also shows that considering the year 1971 and
then the period 1977 through 1979 the grievant was among the top
six employees in each of those years with the largest number of
absences.

However the five others with whom he was compared were

different in each of the years, so that over that period of time
the grievant's absentee record has been the worst.
The Union contends that most of the grievant's absences were
due to illness; that many were substantiated by medical statements
(and that the grievant presented medical substantiation each time
he was asked to do so); that some of the absences were due to
aggravation of an earlier compensable injury; that in none of the
years did the grievant exhaust his sick-leave benefits under the
contract and therefore his absences are not disciplinarily
actionable.
The gravamen of the Union's case is that under the contract,
with his years of service, the grievant is entitled each year to
a number of weeks of fully paid sick leave in excess of the number
of days he was absent.

The Union argues that unless the Company

shows that his claims of illness were untrue and until he exceeds
his contractual sick benefits in any of the years involved, it
has no grounds to impose discipline.
This Arbitrator does not accept that argument.

The sick leave

benefits under this contract are essentially guarantees of full
pay and half pay for continuous periods of disability.

In my view

the instant contract benefit was designed to cover the unusual
circumstance of an extended illness which may come upon an

-3employee infrequently during his period of employment.

In my

judgement it was not intended to provide a regular number of
days that an employee may be absent due to illness as a
continuous condition, yearly and over successive years.

If the

Union's argument was accepted it would mean that year in and year
out an employee could absent himself due to sickness for a number
of days at full pay and thereafter at half pay equal to the weeks
set forth in the schedule on page 42 of the contract corresponding
to that employee's length of service.

Any such interpretation

would not only allow the work force to be absent a substantial
part of the work year, thereby crippling the Company's planning
and productivity, but also would fly in the face of the well established rule that chronic absenteeism over an extended period of
time is

grounds for progressive discipline even if the absences

are due to sickness or other reasons beyond the employee's
control.
In the instant case I conclude that the grievant's record of
absenteeism, particularly for the period 1976 through 1979 was
excessive and, whether due to illness or not, is not protected from
discipline by the maximum disability benefits of the contract.

In

accordance with the aforementioned well established rule the Company
had the

right to impose discipline for that record of absenteeism

whether or not all or most of the absences were due to illness.
However it is noted that this is the grievant's first disciplinary suspension within the progressive discipline steps.
Though a suspension is proper considering the grievant's prior
warnings, it is my view that a suspension of thirty working days
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is too severe and beyond what is necessary to impress the
grievant with the unsatisfactory nature of his attendance
record and the fact that unless it is improved his job is in
jeopardy.

A disciplinary suspension of twelve working days is

more in line with what is reasonable and proper under the
circumstances.

I make this determination and reduce the period

of the grievant's suspension because there is no evidence that
his absences were not due to sickness.

Though the Company is

skeptical it has offered no evidence in this proceeding which
would challenge the legitimacy of the grievant's claimed illnesses
or the validity of the statements from his doctors.

For that

reason, though as I have indicated a disciplinary suspension is
warranted regardless of the reasons for the absences, a lesser
penalty for the first suspension is more appropriate under these
particular circumstances where there is no showing of either
misconduct or falsification.

In short I view a suspension of

thirty working days as more punitive than needed, where, as here,
it has not been shown that the grievant is guilty of misconduct.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The thirty working day suspension of
Anthony Terranova is reduced to a suspension of twelve working days. He
shall be made whole for the difference.
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However he is expressly warned that in
the opinion of this Arbitrator his failure to henceforth maintain a satisfactory
attendance record would be grounds for
further disciplinary action including
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 25, 1980
STATE OF New York )s s *
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-fifth day of July, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IUOE Local 825

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 79/K23590
and

Amboy Terminaling Company
The stipulated issue is:
If an employee refuses to allow a search
of his vehicle, lunch box or other container, can the employee be prohibited
from utilizing parking facilities provided
by the Company within its premises?
A hearing was held in Woodbridge, New Jersey on January
21, 1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
It is stipulated that the Company has been experiencing
a serious problem with pilferage at its plant facility.

It is

II
clear that the Union in no way condones acts of pilferage and
would not defend a member who commits any such offense.
As presented at the hearing the respective cases of the
parties were confined to the Company's policy of searching employee's
vehicles.

The Union claims that such searches have been random,

unrelated to any specific acts of pilferage, indiscriminate, and
therefore unreasonable.

The Union's position is that when a

reasonable connection can be made between a theft and employee,
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group of employees or their vehicles, the Company may then require
that employee(s) to permit a search of his car.

But absent any

such proximate connection, haphazard or random vehicle searches
should be barred, and no disciplinary action should be imposed if
an employee refuses to permit the Company to undertake that search
I do not disagree with the Union's contentions, except
that the facts in the instant case seem to me to meet the test
which would permit the Company to make the searches involved.
fact is that the Company has experienced a serious,
and unusual amount of pilferage.

The

continuing

To my mind that undisputed fact

establishes reasonable grounds for the Company to protect itself,
to take steps not only to attempt to apprehend those responsible
but preliminarily

to determine whether employees are involved, and

in general to discourage any continuation of such illegal acts.
It is well settled that under those circumstances

a reasonable

way for an employer to achieve those legitimate ends is to search
employee vehicles, lunch boxes and other similar personal containers, and even do so on an unannounced and random basis,

Therefore,

considering the extent of the pilferage which the Company has
experienced, I do not find fault with its policy of searching
employee vehicles, lunch boxes and other containers, and the
Company has the right to require its employees to cooperate with
that policy.
However I am not persuaded that the penalty for a refusal
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to allow such a search should be the deprivation of parking
facilities.

It is stipulated that the plant's location requires

employees to travel to and from work by private automobile.
Apparently public transportation is not available.

The parties

agree that if an employee cannot bring his car onto the Company
premises and park it there, he cannot work at this plant.

To

deprive an employee of the right to park on the Company's property
is to take away his employment opportunity with the Company.

In

short the revocation of an employee's parking rights means his
termination.

Therefore the question is whether the penalty of

discharge is at all times the proper and appropriate penalty if
an employee refuses to allow the Company to search his vehicle,
lunch box or other container.

I am not prepared to hold that in

each and every case the penalty of summary dismissal, constructive
or otherwise, is proper and appropriate in all instances in which
an employee refuses to allow the search.

It seems to me that the

type of penalty to be imposed must be determined on a case-by-case
basis, depending upon the circumstances then present, the extent
or magnitude of the employee's lack of cooperation, the details
of and presumptions drawn from specific thefts, and the employee's
prior disciplinary

record.

This is not to say that a refusal to

allow a search under proper circumstances might not warrant the
penalty of discharge.

Rather it is to say that there may also

be conditions under which the penalty imposed should follow the
well settled principal of "progressive discipline."
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company's search policy is upheld
in view of its problems with pilferage.
But its claim that it may revoke parking privileges in every and all cases
in which employees refuse to allow the
search is not upheld. Rather the type
and nature of discipline must be determined
and imposed on a case-by-case basis.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 24, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 24th day of March, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584, I.B.T.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0676 80

and
American Farms, Inc. and Marbledale
Processing Corporation

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the Milk
Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement to which the above named
Union and Employer are signatories, the Undersigned was selected
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the arbitrability of the
Union's claim that the Employer is in violation of Section 3(a),
(b) and (c) of the Wage Schedule of said Agreement.
Hearings were held on September 17th, October 28th and
November 6th, 1980 at which time representatives of the Union and
Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
The Union contends that with regard to certain activities,
another company,

Exterior DeLite,

Inc., d/b/a Country DeLite,

which is not a party to the industry contract, but which is
located at the same address as the Employer with essentially the
same ownership and management and with significant aspects of its
administrative and operational activities integrated with those
of the Employer, is an "alter-ego" of the Employer.

The Union

claims that milk is moved and sold from the Employer to Exterior
and then sold by

Exterior to wholesale dealers and other customers

in violation of the cited contract provisions and in circumvention
of the duty to pay commissions referred to in said contract
provisions.

-2In short, it is the Union's theory that Exterior is not
an entity separate from and independent of the Employer, but
rather a creature or device of the Employer for the transfer
and platform sale of milk in contravention of the contract.

Or

in other words certain sales of milk by Exterior from its store
to outsiders as well as the transfer and/or sale of milk by the
Employer to Exterior, are all activities of the Employer for
which the Employer is responsible under the industry contract.
The fatal flaw with the Union's case is that for several
years it has had a separate and specific collective bargaining
agreement with Exterior, and that the activities of Exterior
were and have been the same throughout that period, including
the activities about which the Union now complains.
I conclude that that collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and Exterior creates an irrebutable presumption of
the separate and independent status of Exterior and makes its
long-term activities under that contract, legitimate.
Manifestly, a contract with Exterior and the Union's present
claim that Exterior is an "alter-ego" of the Employer are mutually
inconsistent.

The Claim is tantamount to an effort by the Union

to now impeach its separate and long-standing contractual relationship with Exterior.

As the contract between the two has existed

much longer than the instant grievance, the contract must prevail,
and the Union is thus estopped from denying or undermining its
meaning and effectiveness by a collateral attack under the industry
contract against the Employer.
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By negotiating two separate contracts, one with the Employer
and another with

Exterior, the Union has recognized and ratified

the separateness and independent identity of the two employers,
as well as the legitimacy of the separate activities of the two
employers including their commerical dealings with each other,
like the processing of milk by one for sale and delivery to the
other.
As a consequence, or a matter of its own contract law, the
Union is now barred from attempting to show that certain functions
of those two employers which have not changed over the years of
the separate contractual relationships are synonymous, or functions
of or imputed to the Employer
For the grievance to be arbitrable requires a finding that
the disputed activities of Exterior

are in actuality the activities

of the Employer, and that impliedly therefore, "Exterior is covered
by the industry collective bargaining agreement
3(a),

and by Sections

(b) and (c) of the Wage Schedule thereof, even though it is

not an express signatory thereto.

That the critical determination

is otherwise means that under the industry contract the Union's
grievance does not reach the activities complained of, and hence
is precedurally non-arbitrable.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
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The Union's grievance set forth in its
letter of April 4, 1980 and in its
Demand for Arbitration dated April 29,
1980, is not arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 11, 1980
STATE OF New York )s s *
COUNTY OF New York ) " * "
On this llth day of December, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION

SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
District 15 of the International
Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K/13535

and
A M Varityper Division

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
Union's Grievance A4218 dated August
28, 1978?
A hearing was held on November 14, 1979 in Newark, New
Jersey at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportun-

ity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A steno-

graphic record was taken, and the parties filed post-hearing
briefs.
Union Grievance A4218, on behalf of employee Katherine
Killiebrew reads:
The Company is in violation of promotional procedures by testing per agreement .
Ms. Killiebrew bid for promotion to the job of Final
Product Inspector, Labor Grade 9.

The Company denied her bid

on the ground that she was unqualified.

Among employees who were

promoted to that position was one, Tony Amoresano, who has less

-2-

seniority than Ms. Killiebrew.

It is the Union's contention that

when Ms. Killiebrew was interviewed following her bid she was
asked questions and was required to perform certain functions
which constituted "a test" in violation of the 1978 settlement
agreement between the parties.

That Agreement provides, inter

alia:
All testing shall be eliminated as a
qualification for promotion.
Additionally, the Union asserts that Ms. Killiebrew was at least
as qualified for the promotion as Mr. Amoresano and that therefore under Article XVII-A of the contract, which provides:
Where ability, skill and experience are
relatively equal, seniority shall be the
determining factor,
Ms. Killiebrew, with the greater seniority, should have been
promoted instead of Mr. Amoresano.

And that pursuant to the

fourth paragraph of Article XVII-A, Ms. Killiebrew should have
been given a thirty working day "try-out."
Based on the record I am persuaded that Ms. Killiebrew's
interview did include some form of testing, albeit in simplified
form.

It is unrefuted that her Departmental Supervisor questioned

her about certain mechanical and electronic component parts used
on equipment with which she would be dealing if promoted, and
asked her to make some fundamental measurements with a ruler,
pencil and paper.

The Company argues that such procedure is

nothing more than a legitimate means to determine an employee's
"ability and skill" within the meaning of Article XVII-A.

And
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that it is not violative of the 1978 settlement agreement because
the prohibition therein relates to written tests which had been
utilized prior to the 1978 contract negotiations.
I do not accept the Company's argument on this point.
The 1978 Settlement Agreement is unconditional.

It states that

all testing shall be eliminated as a qualification for promotion.
Had the parties intended to bar only written tests they could
have, and in my judgement should have, made that distinction.
That they did not, but rather used all inclusive prohibitive
language, means that though written tests had been the previous
practice, the Union's objection to testing led to an unrestricted
mutual agreement to eliminate tests in any form in determining
qualifications for a promotion.

Hence, though what Ms. Killiebre^

was asked to answer and do in the course of her interview, though
a test in simple form, was a test nonetheless, and its use by the
Company violated the Settlement Agreement.
The Company is correct when it argues in its brief that
the record lacks specific evidence of Ms. Killiebrew's ability,
skill and experience for the job promotion.

On the other hand

there is no evidence whatsoever regarding the ability, skill and
experience of Mr. Amoresano, whom the Company selected. I do not
agree with the Company's assertion that Ms. Killiebrew and the
Union on her behalf have the burden of fully establishing her
ability, skill and experience before the Company has any obligation to explain and support its selection of a less senior

-4candidate.

In "seniority and ability" cases, the arbitrator is

called upon either to compare the abilities, skill, qualifications
and experience of the employees in contest for the promotion, or
at least make a determination whether the employer's selection
was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.

In the instant

case, and consistent with well settled arbitration procedures, with
the general testimony adduced by the Union that Ms. Killiebrew
was at least as qualified as Mr. Amoresano, the burden shifts to
the Company for an explanation not only why it deemed her unqualified, but also why it found a less senior employee possessed
of the ability, skill and experience for promotion.

By not doing

so the Company makes it impossible for the arbitrator to determine whether the provisions of Article XVII-A were factually
complied with, or more simply whether the Company's action was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Accordingly the matter is remanded to the parties for
the following purpose and procedure.

The Company shall evaluate

Ms. Killiebrew's ability, skill and experience without requiring
her to take or perform any oral, written, or mechanical tests
whatsoever.

That evaluation is to be compared with the ability,

skill and experience of Mr. Amoresano.

The Company shall then

make a new determination as to which of those two employees is
entitled to the promotion under the provisions of Article XVII-A
of the contract.

The Union's right to grieve that determination

is reserved, and in that event the matter may be referred back
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to the Undersigned who shall retain jurisdiction.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated the 1978
Agreement by giving Katherine
a test in connection with her
promotion to the job of Final
Inspector, Grade 9.

Settlement
Killiebrew
bid for
Product

Ms. Killiebrew1s ability, skill and experience shall be reevaluated by the Company
without giving her any form of a test. That
evaluation shall then be compared with the
ability, skill and experience of Mr. Tony
Amoresano, and the Company shall make a de
novo decision as to which of those two
employees are entitled to the promotion
under Article XVII-A of the contract. If
the Union disagrees with that determination
it may refer the matter back to the Undersigned who shall retain jurisdiction for
that purpose.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 24, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this 24th day of March, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same .

July 7, 1980
Joseph V. Ippolito, Esq.
AT&T Long Lines
3edrainister, New Jersey 07921
RE: Arbitration between Communication
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local
1150 and American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, Long Lines Department
(Dismissal of Constance Costello)
Case No. LL-78-748
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
Thank you for your letter of June 24th. I am pleased
that both the Company and the Union seriously considered and attempted
to implement my original Award in the above matter. As I stated, I
believe the approach of the original Award was the most appropriate
resolution of what you correctly described as a "difficult case",
and I am heartened that the Company and the Union seemed to agree.
With regard to Ms. Costello's objection, and her actions
after rendition of the second and final Award, do you rerafber the
ending to Anatomy of A Murder?
Sincerely,

'iric J. Schmertz
.Arbitrator
EJSrhls

AT&T Long Lines
Joseph V. ippolito
Attorney

Bedminster, New Jersey 07921
Phone (201) 234-6322

June 24, 1980

Eric J. Schmertz, P.C.
122 East 42nd Street - Suite 1515
New York, New York
10017
Re:

Arbitration between Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 1150 and American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Department
(Dismissal of Constance Costello)
Case No. LL-78-748

Dear Arbitrator Schmertz:
The Company's draft in the amount of $1,050, in payment of the
Company's portion of your fee for the above matter, has been forwarded
to you under separate cover.
I wish to take this opportunity on behalf of the Company to
thank you for your service in this difficult case. The Company and
the Union were constrained to request of you a substituted Award
when the grievant refused to accept your original Award and insisted
that the original Award was not in conformity with the provisions of
the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement. As you can well
imagine, the efforts of the Company and the Union to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory implementation of that original Award were
thereby thwarted.
It might also interest you to know that Ms. Costello was
reinstated by the Company on June 16, 1980, in compliance with your
Award of May 30, 1980.
On that same day, upon collection of her back
pay, Ms. Costello resigned from the Company.
Very truly yours,

JVIrkam

May 30, 1980
Joseph Ippolito, iisq.
Counsel for American Telephone
and Telegraph Company (Long
Lines Department)
Room 3C-146
Bedminister, New Jersey 07921
Philip D. Tobin, Esq.
Conn, Glickstein, Lurie, Ostrin,
Lubell & Lube11
1370 Avenue of The Americas
New York, New York 10019
RE: In The Matter of The Arbitration
between Communication Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 1150 and
American Telephone and Telegraph
Company, Long Lines Department
Op_in.ion and /-ward, Case JLL--78-748
Gentlemen:
In accordance with your joint letter of April 29, 1980, I
enclose to you each herewith my duly executed "definite5' Award and
Ooinion in^strthe above matter. My previous "Award" of April 21, 1980
is withdrawn.
Very truly yours,

EJS:hls
Encl.

F.ric J. Schmert3
Arbitrator

April 29, 1980
Eric Schmertz, P.C.
122 East 42 Street - Suite 1515
New York, New York 10017
Re: In The Matter of The Arbitration Between
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO,Local 1150
and American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
Long Lines Department.
Opinion and Award: Case #LL-78-748
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
Our respective principals have instructed us to write
this joint letter to you expressing their concern regarding
the Award rendered in the above-captioned case, and to request
that you withdraw the Award of April 21, 1980 and issue a
definite Award in conformity with the stipulated issue and the
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement applicable
to discipline cases.
Both parties agree to abide by such Award.
Sincerely yours,

Joseph" Ippoli£«£, Esq.
Counsel for American Telephone
and Telegraph Company (Long
Lines Department)
Room 3C-146
Bedminster, New Jersey 07921

Tobin, Esq.
Counsel for Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO
Cohn,Clickstein,Lurie,Ostrin,
Lubell & Lubell
1370 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
The American Guild of Musical
Artists, Inc. AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #1330-0623-79

and
Artists International, Inc.

The Employer, Artists International, Inc. failed to
appear at the hearing on July 1, 1980, after due notice thereof.
Instead the Employer informed the American Arbitration
Association that it did not dispute AGMA's claim on behalf of
Lucille Englebright, and that it would be bound by the Arbitrator's
decision.
I consider the Employer's position to be tantamount to a
"confession of judgement."

Accordingly AGMA's claim on behalf of

Lucille Englebright is granted.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, makes
the following AWARD:
Artists International, Inc. is directed
to pay to Lucille Englebright, the sum
of $1000. by reason of its breach of its
Agreement dated the 26th day of December,
1977, together with interest thereon in
accordance with law.

DATED: July 14, 1980
STATE OF New York ),
)_„
.
D O •*
COUNTY OF New York )'

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this fourteenth day of July, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 8-917

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K/19155

and
Ashland Chemical Company

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Company violated Article III of
the contract by making one rule change
and two rule additions effective September
1, 1979?
A hearing was held at Edison, New Jersey on January 23,
1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The pertinent part of Article III is Section 3.01(a)(2)
which reads:
3.01(a) The Company retains the sole right
to manage the affairs of the business and to
direct the working forces of the Company,
such functions of management include, but are
not limited to, the right to:
(2) Maintain discipline of employees, including the right to make reasonable rules and
regulations for the purpose of efficiency, safety
and discipline. The Company will inform the
Union of any changes in existing rules and regulations or the establishment of new rules and
regulations before such changes are made effective.
The Union reserves the right through the grievance
procedure to question the reasonableness of any

-2new rule or change in existing rules. In
the event the Union processes a grievance
under this paragraph through the grievance
procedure and the arbitrator decides the
new rule or change in existing rules is unreasonable, the Company will withdraw the
new rule or change.
The plant rules, divided into Groups I through IV are part
of the contract on pages 25-A through 28-A thereof.

The rule

change which the Company made is in section 2 under Group I.

The

rule additions it made became sections 6 and 7 of Group IV.
Prior to the instant disputed rule change, section 2 of
Group I read:
2. Unauthorized absence or lateness for
work in excess of two working days per
month. However, absence due to illness
which is substantiated by a certificate
from a medical doctor is not to be considered as an unauthorized absence. Lateness reported, which is excused by the
Company, shall not be considered a violation.
The Company changed that rule to read and provide:
"Unauthorized absence or lateness for work
in excess of one day during any four consecutive calendar months. However, absence
due to illness which is substantiated by a
certificate from a medical doctor is not to
be considered as an unauthorized absence.
Lateness reported, which is excused by the
Company, shall not be considered a violation."
The Union asserts that under the old rule employees were
not subject to discipline under the Group I disciplinary formula
until and unless they compiled more than two unauthorized absences
or latenesses per month, and that therefore over a year employees
could be absent or late with impunity a total of 24 times.

Under

the changed rule, the Union complains, the potential of 24 absences
or latenesses over a year (spaced on a 2 a month basis) has been
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radically reduced to a single day within a four consecutive month
period, for an annual total of three.

The Union considers this

drastic reduction in the number of unauthorized absences or
latenesses which the Company will tolerate, as unreasonable.
The Company, both in documentation previously provided the
Union and in argument in this case as to how the changed rule
would be applied, contends that under the changed rule employees
will be charged with a lesser number of unauthorized
latenesses than they were under the old rule.

absences or

The Company points

out that in its implementation of the old rule, virtually every
single absence was deemed unauthorized; whereas under the new rule
such absences, if properly reported and for "an important reason"
will normally be excused.

It points out that any absences due to

illnesses which are substantiated medically, will continue to be
excused.

Additionally, the Company asserts that because of

attendance and lateness difficulties which have impeded production, it has the managerial right to take steps to reduce absenteeism and lateness and that the new rule is a reasonable exercise
of that right within the meaning of Article III of the contract.
As I see it the reasonableness of a new or changed rule and/
or the reasonableness of additional rules is not based on the rule
standing alone, but rather on a comparison between the change and/
or addition with what previously existed.

Here, though the

Company has represented that it plans to administer the aforesaid
changed rule in such a way as to accord the employees fewer
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recorded unauthorized absences (by apparently treating single day
absences as presumptively valid, if a satisfactory reason is
given), it has expressly reserved the right to require that
medical certification be provided for first day absences "in
individual cases."

In my view this means that despite the Company's

stated plans regarding implementation of the changed rule, it has
retained to itself the power and right to effectuate precisely
what the Union fears, namely a net reduction in excused absences
or latenesses from an annual 24 (on a 2 a month basis) to annual
three (1 every four months).

The question therefore is whether

it is reasonable for the Company to acquire that right in the
form of the disputed rule change.
Not only is it well settled that an

employer may promulgate

rules directed towards reducing absenteeism and lateness, but
under the circumstances of this case, confronted with an apparently
undisputed attendance and lateness problem among some employees,
the Company has the right under Article III to promulgate rules
and make rule changes directed to that problem.
must be reasonable.

But what it does

Standing alone I would not find unreasonable

the changed rule limiting the unauthorized absences and latenesses
to one every four months.

But in comparison with what previously
'
obtained, I conclude that the change is too dramatic and drastic
to meet the test of reasonableness.

That the Company would ad-

minister and implement the changed rule in a fair and reasonable
manner is not in question.

Rather, because the Company has re-

tained to itself the right to administer the rule rigidly and in
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such a manner as to so dramatically reduce the number of unauthorized absences and latenesses which would be tolerated, an unreasonable comparison follows between that and what previously
was allowed.

Therefore the rule change of Section 2 of Group I

of the plant rules as it presently stands is voided, and in
accordance with the last sentence of Article III Section 3.01(a)
(2) of the contract it shall be withdrawn.
To Group IV the Company has added Sections 6 and 7 as follows
respectively:
"Negligence or carelessness resulting in
serious bodily injury (whether to self or others)
or property damage in excess of $10,000."
"Chronic and/or excessive absenteeism or lateness whether authorized or not (provided the
employee has been counseled at least one time)."
As I stated at the hearing it appeared to me, and I now
conclude that the new section 7 of Group IV is inconsistent with
section 2 of Group I.

Under the latter section a certain number

of unauthorized absences or latenesses are excused.

Under the

former, those very absences or latenesses, if chronic, may be
used against an employee to effectuate and support his dismissal.
I fail to see how an employee can be excused on one hand and
penalized for the same offense on the other.

I am fully mindful

of the well settled rule that chronic absenteeism or lateness for
whatever reason is grounds for an employee's ultimate discharge.
But again, applying the comparison between the new rule and what
previously existed as the basis for determining reasonableness,
that rule must be modified by the present express contract provision
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under Group I section 2 which excuses a certain number of unauthorized absences or latenesses.

Under that circumstance,

though discharge for chronic lateness or absences would still be
proper, the measurement or determination of a chronic absentee
or lateness record must be made not on an employee's total unauthorized absence and/or lateness record, but on that portion
of the record in excess of the

quantity of unauthorized absences

or latenesses excused under section 2 of Group I.

Therefore to

the extent that section 7 of Group IV does not exclude the quantity
of unauthorized absences or latenesses excused under section 2 of
Group I, the rule is unreasonable and is to be withdrawn.
With regard to the addition of section 6 to Group IV, I
find that rule to be reasonable.

The Company has the right to

protect itself against the serious consequences of negligence or
carelessness.

I do not agree with the Union that section 11 of

Group" I or section 3 of Group II cover the situations to which
the new section 7 of Group IV is directed.

I do not agree with

the Union that the phrase "negligence or carelessness" is too
vague.

Those are well used words; they have legal significance;

and they have been adequately interpreted. Indeed the meanings of
both words have been as fully set by judicial and arbitral interpretation as the word "reasonable" which the parties used in
Article III and upon which this entire case rests.

Whether the

seriousness of the offense under section 6 of Group IV should be
"property damage in excess of $10,000" is open to some debate.
The Union points out that a single batch of chemicals may be worth
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that amount or more, and to discharge an employee for the loss
or destruction of that batch due to negligence or carelessness,
is too harsh a penalty.
reasons.

I do not see it that way for several

First it is not just the loss or destruction of the

product which would trigger the disciplinary penalty, but rather
its loss due to the employee's negligence or carelessness.

Under

the rule the burden is on the Company to show that the employee
was negligent or careless, and that that was the proximate cause
of the property loss.

If that is shown I do not consider that a

property loss in excess of $10,000 is too small a monetary amount
to impose discipline, including discharge.
also applicable to "serious bodily injury
others)."

Moreover, the rule is
(whether to self or to

Under that circumstance if such injury resulted from

negligence or carelessness, I do not find fault with a rule which
would bring about the dismissal of the employee who caused that
injury.

Finally, though section 6 falls within Group IV, and

that group of offenses calls for discharge with the first violation,
it does not mean that in each and every situation the Company will
impose that full penalty.

Rather it means that the Company has

the right of summary dismissal if that offense is committed but
that, under the particular circumstances that may then be involved,
it may in its discretion, and I expect that at times it will,
impose lesser penalties where such circumstances warrant lesser
action.

For these reasons I find that the new section 6 of Group

IV to be reasonable and a proper addition to the plant rules.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
As particularized in the Opinion above the
Company violated Article III of the contract
by changing the rule set forth in section 2
of Group I, and by adding section 7 to Group
IV of the plant rules0 It did not violate
Article III by adding section 6 to Group IV
of the plant rules.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 1, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "'
On this first day of June, 1980 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NEW YORK STATE MEDIATION BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Glass Warehouse Workers and
Paint Handlers Local Union 206

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A79-374

and

Babylon Glass Works, Inc.

In accordance with Article XX of the collective bargaining
agreement dated June 5, 1978 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
Notice of Arbitration dated January 9, 1979?
A hearing was held at Hofstra Law School in Hempstead,
New York on November 29, 1979 at which time representatives of
the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties agreec

to exchange certain payroll exhibits possessed by the Company
15 days after the hearing date and to file post-hearing briefs
postmarked no later than December 29, 1979.

In its brief the

Union claimed that it "did not receive the subpoenaed exhibits
until December 26, 1979, almost two weeks after they were
promised."

As a result, the Union submitted its brief dated

January 10, 1980.

Under the circumstances the record remained

open until January 31, 1980, however, the Company did not file a
post-hearing brief.

-2Babylon Glass Works, Inc., hereinafter Babylon, is engaged
in the installation of glass.

The instant case concerns the

relationship between Babylon and Deer Park Glass Works, Inc.,
hereinafter Deer Park, which is engaged in mirror installation.
The dispute also concerns the relationship between the Company
and T & R Glass Co, which is an aluminum installer and the
Company and Elite Mirror which is a mirror installer.

Babylon

has existed for approximately 25 years and Deer Park has existed
for approximately 15 years.

Arthur Boesch is President of

Babylon as well as President of Deer Park.

Babylon employed

union workers whereas Deer Park employed non-union workers.
Babylon and the Union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement that covered the period from 1975 to March 31, 1978.
The Agreement designated the Union as the exclusive bargaining
agent for all occupations listed in the jurisdiction clause.

The

Agreement provided in Section 3 of the Recognition Clause that
the "Employer reserves the right to operate another glass corp.
in the same building independent of recognized union employees,
in order to compete with non union shops within a 25 mile radius„"
After the expiration of the 1975-1978 Agreement, Babylon and the
Union signed a new agreement on June 5, 1978 covering the period
from April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1981.

The 1978-1981 Agreement

included an exclusive bargaining agent clause that applied, inter
alia, to all employees who handle glass.

The Agreement did not

contain a clause that permitted Babylon to operate another glass

_ Q_

corporation in the same building independent of the recognized
union employees.
The parties stipulated that during 1978 and early 1979
Babylon and Deer Park suffered a loss of work.

This lack of work

subsequently led to layoffs of employees of Babylon and of
employees of Deer Park.

The parties stipulated that after June

29, 1979, Babylon only employed Joseph Fortier.

Messrs. Budds

and Schoeppe were laid off effective Janury 5, 1979.

After

July 6, 1979 the only employees of Deer Park were Arthur Boesch,
Joan Boesch, two salespersons, and two clerical employees.

The

parties also stipulated that only one checking account in the
Babylon name existed for Babylon and for Deer Park; no separate
account existed for Deer Park.

In each company the employees

generally work in pairs consisting of one mechanic and one
helper.

The parties further stipulated that for a number of

years before and during the arrival of the Union, Babylon used
other companies to do certain aluminum work.
The Union notified Babylon in a letter dated January 9,
1979 that it was submitting certain disputes to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
then in effect.

Specifically, the Union alleged contractual

violations concerning: 1) the layoff of Kenny Budds; 2) the
layoff of Charles Schoeppe; 3) the failure to notify the Union
of the hiring of new employees; 4) the failure to make pension,
welfare, and annuity contributions for non-union employees and
to file the required reports; and 5) the failure to pay proper

-4wages and benefits to non-union employees.

On January 9, 1979

the Union also filed an unfair labor practice charge against
Babylon with the National Labor Relations Board in which the
Union alleged that Babylon's termination of Kenny Budds and
Charles Schoeppe as well as its failure to provide certain benefits for non-union employees constituted conduct that violated
Section 8(a)

(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations

Act 0

In accordance with the policy of the National Labor Relations
Board, the disposition of the unfair labor practice has been held
in abeyance pending the issuance of this arbitration Opinion and
Award.
PERTINENT CONTRACT CLAUSES
The following clauses in the 1978-1981 Agreement are
applicable to this case at the present time:
Recognition
Section 1. The Employer recognizes the Union
as the sole collective bargaining agent for all
occupations described and listed in the jurisdiction clause and such other new occupations as
may from time to time be established by the
Employer. . . .
Article 1
Hiring of New Employees and Non-Discrimination
Section 1. The Employer and the Union shall continue their policy of not discriminating against
any employee. . . because of membership or
activity in the Union.
Article II
Jurisdiction
This Union shall have trade jurisdiction over
the following: Cutters,. . . Plate and Window
Glass Handlers,. . . Automobile Glass installers, Glass Warehouse Workers,. . . Glass Fabrication, Tempering Glass, Laminating Glass, Insulating Glass and Plastics Workers, Mirror

-5Painters, Glass Washers,. . . and all other
inside and outside employees who handle glass
and allied workers, including drivers, helpers
indelivery operations to and from all sites
and, in addition, including also hoisting,
loading and unloading of boxed and loose glass
and all materials, and incidental and related
operations.
Article V
Seniority and Lay-Off
Section 3. With respect to lay-off, job classification seniority shall prevail, that is, the
employee with the least amount of seniority in
the job classification shall be layed-off first.
Article XXII
The Employer shall not sub-let or sub-contract
any work under the jurisdiction of this agreement without reasonable advance notice to the
Union. The Employer agrees to give notice to
any person, partnership or corporation undertaing (sic) such sub-let and sub-contract work
of the existence of this agreement and the terms
and conditions thereof.
The Employer agrees not to form and enter into
a merger, consolidation, venture, purchase or
sale of business, or any contract, agreement or
understanding, any of which involves performance
of operation (sic) coming within the jurisdiction
and classification of employment of this agreement
unless reasonable advance notice of such contemplated action is given to the Union and also
agrees to give notice to such contracting parties
of this agreement and the terms and conditions
thereof.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union contends that the present grievance involves the
continued operation of a "double-breasted shop" in contravention
of the current collective bargaining agreement.

In advancing

this claim the Union argues that Deer Park is an alter ego of
Babylon and is bound by the provisions of the agreement entered

-6into between Babylon and the Union.

The Union relies upon the

common supervision and control of the employees for the two
corporations, the single payroll account in Babylon's name that
the two

corporations utilized, and the interchange of employees

between the two corporations.

The Union asserts that the bargain!

ing history between Babylon and the Union establishes that the
double-breasted shop permitted under the 1975-1978 Agreement was
to end in 1978 since the 1978-1981 Agreement omitted the clause
under which the parties had permitted the double-breasted shop
to exist.

Accordingly, the Union maintains that all provisions

of the current collective bargaining agreement apply to all of
the employees of Babylon and Deer Park and that the failure of
Babylon and Deer Park to honor the various provisions must be
remedied through an appropriate award herein.

The Union also

alleges that the dealings between Babylon and T & R Glass Co.
and between Deer Park and Elite Mirror constitute a subterfuge
to avoid the contractual obligations of the Union's contract.
In essence, the Union position is that the Company has improperly
sub-contracted bargaining unit work and that bargaining unit
employees have been laid off while the sub-contractors are
performing the work that should be performed by members of the
bargaining unit.

The Union, therefore, seeks the reinstatement

of bargaining unit employees to do the work that belongs to the
bargaining unit.
The Union presented a number of witnesses in support of
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its position.

The first witness, Arthur Boesch, called by

the Union, is President of Babylon and President of Deer ParkQ
After identifying the 1975-1978 Agreement and the 1978-1981
Agreement which he had signed, Boesch testified that he had
personally installed automobile glass since July 1979 when he
laid off Kenneth Petrie.

Boesch then described the job duties

of Charles Schoeppe as including the installation of outside
glass at storefronts, schools and houses; installation of storm
doors; and, in general, work referred to as aluminum work.
Boesch continued that he lost all of the school contracts from
which he had received work and that he sends the one or two
house break calls he receives each week to T & R Glass.

T & R

Glass buys the glass from Boesch at regular retail prices and
then bills the customer most of the time.

Boesch receives no

fees from T & R Glass other than the purchase price of the glass„
The witness continued that Deer Park was originally formed to
protect the name from use by a potential competitor.
and Deer Park maintained

Babylon

separate payrolls but all employees

received their compensation on Babylon checks for the last five
to seven years.

Boesch indicated that if a mirror job came in,

a Babylon employee would do the fabrication work and a Deer Park
employee would do the installation or hanging work.
With respect to the various employees, Boesch stated that
Schoeppe worked for Babylon and was laid off on January 5, 1979.
Boesch then provided the following information concerning the

-laemployees of Deer Park for the week ending January 12, 1979:
Name

Job Status

Arthur Boesch
Joan Boesch
Ignatius Forte
Dennis Harvey
Diane Lowe
Jean Sadousky
Keven Powell
James Domeischell, Harry
Steinmetz & Matthew D. Lake
Eugene Kenny

President—outside unit
Secretary—outside unit
Sales — outside unit
Sales—outside unit
Secretary — outside unit
Secretary—outside unit
Fabricating, glass installer
Helpers and mirror installers
Temporary auto glass installer

Boesch continued that Budds served as a helper in the fabrication department of Babylon.

Although Budds carried glass,

Boesch admitted that carrying glass was the same as carrying
mirrors.

Boesch also mentioned that Lake continued to be

employed until July 6, 1979, after having been hired on September
29, 1978 as a mirror helper.
Boesch then indicated that Petrie only worked on auto glass
for Babylon, yet in April 1978 the Deer Park payroll records
r eflected that Petrie was on vacation.

As of the week ending

October 27, 1978, Petrie was switched from the Deer Park payroll
although all of his job duties remained the same.

Boesch noted

that Kevin Powell worked for Deer Park in April 1978 and was
involved with insulating and glass fabrication.

Boesch related

that the employees are generally in and out of the shop during
the course of the day.
Insofar as the relationships between Boesch and T & R
Glass and Elite Mirror are concerned, Boesch stressed that there '•
are no written contracts, that both contractors purchase their

-8own insurance, and that each company is a separate business.
Boesch admitted that he had advised both contractors when they
came to him to get proper insurance coverage and referred them
to an insurance agent.

The witness estimated that six or seven

mirror jobs are referred to Elite Mirror each week and that
three or four storm door and storm window jobs are referred to
T & R Glass each week.

The amount of each referral varies

depending upon the extent of the work.

Deer Park currently

employs Boesch and certain office clerical employees.

The mirror

work is billed by Babylon even though Elite Mirror does the work.
Boesch testified that in May 1979 taxable sales were
$20,463.69 and nontaxable sales were $22,538.55.

These figures

include the Elite Mirror billings but not the T & R Glass billings
except for the aluminum products.

The glass work of T & R Glass

originated through Babylon but T & R Glass performed the work
independently.
On redirect examination Boesch stated that the Deer Park
employees had no annuity but that the retirement plan encompassec
that benefit.

The plan provided for minimum vesting after four

years and full vesting after ten years.
Boesch then defined fabrication as including
polishing, and drilling.

cutting,

Hal Schmutz had done the cutting in

the past whereas Boesch and Fortier currently do that work.

When

Budds and Schoeppe were laid off, there were employees of Deer
Park still working who had less seniority.

Neither Budds nor

-9Schoeppe asked Boesch to lay off employees of Deer Park.
During subsequent redirect examination Boesch stated that
T & R Glass does the Babylon School District work and is billed
through Babylon.
per month.

This work amounts to approximately two windows

On redirect Boesch stated that Babylon and Deer Park

each had separate payroll records.

The Babylon payroll records

for the weeks ending April 7, 1978 to July 6, 1979 are Union
Exhibit 2 and the Deer Park payroll records for the weeks ending
April 7, 1978 to July 13, 1979 are Union Exhibit 3.

Boesch

further stated that the two businesses are covered by a single
payroll account, one workmens compensation policy, a single
unemployment benefit account, a single federal employer tax
number, and a single checking account.
The Union then called as a witness Joseph Bondi, the
President and Business Manager of the Union for the past two
years.

Bondi stated that he had been a Business Representative

of the Union since 1966.

He first negotiated an agreement with

the Company on June 5, 1978 at which time he had informed the
Company that there were to be no non-union employees working at
Babylon and suggested that apprentices be hired in conformity
with the provisions of the agreement.

Bondi mentioned that the

agreement is a master agreement that is negotiated by the Union
and the two associations

that represent various shops.

The

master agreement is then applied to various independent shops
as the Company.

Bondi stated that he did not know the names of

-10the non-union employees but that there were five non-union
employees working at the time.

Bondi testified that he served

as a trustee of the Trust Funds and that the Company never
notified the funds of the names of the non-union employees.
Bondi claimed that it made no difference to him whether the
employees were working for Babylon or Deer Park because the same
employer was involved.

After the Agreement was signed on June

5, 1978, Bondi's assistant, Mike Karp, identified Petrie as a
non-union employee and it was at that time that Bondi had insisted
that Petrie join the Union.
Bondi next identified certain remittance sheets that the
Union had sent to the Company.

The Company had filled in the

names of the union employees on the sheet and sent in the
appropriate payment to cover the contribution for the pension,
annuity and welfare funds.
Bondi admitted that he knew of the 1975-1978 Agreement in
which there was a special provision for the Deer Park operation,
but considered that Agreement to be a "piece of trash" that was
irrelevant to the 1978-1981 Agreement.
In January 1979 after Schoeppe had contacted the Union,
Bondi indicated that there were to be no non-union employees
working if union employees were to be laid off.
this position to Karp who then contacted Boesch.

Bondi conveyed
Bondi then

testified that he had spoken to Boesch by telephone around
January 5 or 8, 1979.

Bondi testified that it was at this point

that the Union decided to file for arbitration.

-11On redirect examination Bondi indicated that the master
agreement had approximately
union members.

100 signatories that covered 800

He stated that the monthly membership meeting

of the Union attracts only 20 union members.
The Union next called Charles Schoeppe who had been employe*
for approximately 11 to 13 years and was laid off on January 5,
1979.

Schoeppe testified that his job duties included every-

thing: plate glass, storefronts, frames, new fronts, reconditioning old fronts, mirrors, and aluminum work.

Schoeppe

stated that he did mirrors if there was a big job or if business
was slow in his work he would be transferred to do other work.
He also did auto glass installation for Babylon.
that Deer Park existed.

Schoeppe knew

He saw the mirror workers do glass

installations and storefronts on occasion.

He knew Budds was

an all-around helper and had observed Budds do outside work involving both mirrors and glass.

With respect to the layoff,

Schoeppe testified that he was laid off because he had the least
seniority of the union employees but that he had inquired why
he was laid off and not the non-union employees.

Schoeppe

stated that Schmutz, Petrie, and all of the mirror employees had
less seniority than he had.
On redirect Schoeppe indicated that he told Karp in either
1977 or 1978 that there were non-union employees working for the
Company but that he told Bondi only after the January

1979

layoff.
The Union then called Joseph Fortier as a witness.

Fortier

-12is currently employed and is the shop steward.

Fortier stated

that he knew Karp visited the shop once every four to six weeks.
Fortier also revealed that he knew of the non-union help before
the layoffs.

Fortier testified

that there was no discrimination

regarding the work rules for the union and non-union employees.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPANY
The Company contends that the operation of Babylon and
Deer Park constitute a valid, double-breasted business.

The

1975-1978 collective bargaining agreement expressly permitted
the Deer Park non-union enterprise to exist and the Union knew
of this fact.

The Deer Park employees received similar benefits

and there was no difference in pay.

The layoffs in January

1979

became necessary due to a decrease in business that resulted in
a lack of work.

Mike Karp, a union representative, was advised

of this situation and that two union employees (Messrs. Budds
and Schoeppe) and two non-union employees were being laid off
on the basis of seniority.

The business situation further

deteriorated so that all of the employees were laid off except
for the union steward, Joseph Fortier.
The Company maintains that it does business with two
independent contractors who are totally independent.

They are

separate business entities that are not on the Company's payroll
that carry their own insurance, and own their own trucks.

The

first company, T & R Glass Co., is an aluminum installer that
is separate and apart and has done work for the Company for the
last 15 years.

The second company, Elite Mirror is a mirror

-13installer that is a completely separate operation.

The Company

argues that since mirror installation is beyond the jurisdiction
of the collective bargaining agreement--namely, the non-union
Deer Park entity that does mirror work—the relationship between
the Company and Elite Mirror is irrelevant to the current proceeding.

The Company points out that the Union's jurisdiction

is paint handlers; whereas, the Company is engaged in glass and
mirror work.

The Company notes that the Union has never supplied

any workers so that new employees are always outsiders.
The Company claims that the Union delegate knew that there
had been a separate operation for mirror installation for 15
years.

The Company denies having fired anyone because of

membership in the Union but rather because of a lack of work.
Although the Company let go of an auto glass installer who belonged to the Union, the Company now was rehiring him since
business is picking up.

The Company further asserts that the

two independent contractors are not doing any work that was done
by the bargaining unit.
Although the Company did not present any witnesses of its
own, the Company's attorney did cross-examine every witness that
the Union called.

On cross-examination Arthur Boesch testified

that Petrie had changed payrolls from Deer Park to Babylon because
he had joined the Union and that the Company was rehiring Petrie
due to an increase in business.

Boesch pointed out that the

aluminum work that T & R Glass performs had been done by other
independent contractors over the years such as Richard Shaw and
Imperial Jalousie.
Boesch indicated that Elite Mirror did the mirror work after

-14the Deer Park non-union employees were let go.

Prior to the

layoffs, the Company employed six union workers for the Babylon
operation and six non-union workers for the Deer Park operation.
Boesch noted that the mechanics receive higher compensation than
the helpers due to their greater level of skill.
not do installation work of any kind.

A helper could

The mechanic does the

cutting or fabricating while the helper assists with handling
and polishing.

Boesch reiterated that the mirror installing

operation had not been unionized and therefore was not subject
to the agreement.

Although the non-union employees did not get

union benefits, Boesch testified that they received comparable
pension benefits including the equivalent of an annuity.
In discussing the January 1979 layoffs, Boesch denied that
the layoffs had anything to do with union activities.

The lay-

offs consisted of two union employees—an inside worker and an
outside worker—and two non-union employees who were the
equivalent of one mirror crew.

The non-union employees, Frank

Fernandez and Harry Steinmetz, were laid off two weeks after the
union employees as a personal accommodation, rather than
simultaneously with the union employees. Boesch spoke to Karp
to inform him of this situation.
With respect to the loss of business, Boesch confirmed that
the Company lost three contracts with the Deer Park, West Islip,
and Wyandanch school systems that had provided $150,000 per year
in revenues.

This work primarily consisted of replacing broken

windows caused by vandals and was assigned to employees Kenna

-15and Schoeppe.

Boesch related that Karp proposed that it would

be better to reduce everyone's hours in order to avoid a layoff
but that the employees had rejected this idea because they
could not live on a half day's pay.
Insofar as the transfer of Petrie is concerned, Boesch
stated that he had informed Bondi of the work structure and that
Petrie did not want to join

the Union.

Bondi insisted that

Petrie join and as a result Boesch transferred Petrie from the
Deer Park payroll to the Babylon payroll.
Boesch stressed the fact that Karp visited the shop every
six weeks or so and never had objected to the non-union operatior
of Deer Park.

Boesch also testified that none of the laid off

employees had been replaced.
On recross-examination

Boesch amended his earlier testimony

regarding the loss of work from the school districts by noting
that the Company still does $600 to $700 each year of work for
the Babylon School District.

The lost work consisted of $50,000

per year from the North Babylon School District, $50,000 per
year from the West Islip School District, $50,000 per year from
the Deer Park School District, and $45,000 per year from the
Wyandanch School District.
On cross-examination

of Joseph Bondi, Bondi indicated that

he was not sure if he had discussed the layoff situation with
Boesch in January 1979.

Bondi admitted that he did not state

to the National Labor Relations Board that the non-union employees
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Bondi denied any knowledge of the

non-union employees after the 1978-1981 Agreement was signed unti
the fact of their existence was brought to his attention at the
time of the January 1979 layoffs.

Bondi claimed that Karp had

inspected the shop and had only discovered Petrie.

On recross-

examination Bondi stated that the purpose of visiting each shop
was to collect money and to ascertain whether any contract
violations were being committed.

Bondi testified that Karp

should have inquired whether there were any non-union workers
employed.
On cross-examination Charles Schoeppe testified that he did
all types of work and was classified as a glazier.
breakage work which had declined in volume.

He did school

Schoeppe knew that

non-union employees worked for the Company and that there was a
high turnover of employees.

Schoeppe stated that Petrie did the

main portion of the auto glass installation work, although Schoeppe
had also done car and bus installation of glass.
Petrie sometimes did outside work.

He noted that

Schoeppe indicated that he

sometimes saw Karp at the shop and that he did tell Karp that
there were non-union employees working there.

Schoeppe testifiec

that it was no secret who was a union worker and who was a nonunion worker.
On cross-examination Joseph Fortier indicated that he spoke
to Karp about the non-union people for the last time before the
layoffs.

Fortier claimed that he had never spoken to Bondi.

Fortier stated that he knew about the non-union clause in the
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With respect to T & R Glass and Elite

Mirror, Fortier sees the mirror crew every day when the mechanic
and helper come to pick up job tickets.

In contract, Fortier

stated that the glass crew come in and go out but not every day.
Fortier testified that he does all kinds of work but had done
mirror work mostly one year ago.
DISCUSSION
The threshold question before me is whether Babylon and
Deer Park constitute a valid, double-breasted operation that
places Deer Park beyond the scope of the 1978-1981 Agreement
between the Union and Babylon.

In clarifying the law concerning

double-breasted enterprises, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local No. 626,
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 425 U.S.
800 (1976), that a determination must be made as to whether
entities constitute a single employer.

In applying the collec-

tive bargaining agreement to double-breasted shops, the key test
is whether, given a single employer finding, the employees of
each of the companies constitute a distinct and separate bargaining unit.
(1977).

See Naccarato Construction Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1394
In addition, the standards for making the single employer

finding are different from those for determining the appropriateness of the unit.
13 (1977).

See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No.

In summary, if the employees of each company of a

single employer constitute a distinct and separate unit, then
the double-breasted operation is valid and the collective
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other one.

If, however, the employees of each company of a

single employer belong in the same unit, then the collective
bargaining agreement of one company will be extended to apply
to the other one.
Turning to the issue of whether Babylon and Deer Park
constitute a single employer, four factors are relevant.

The

circumstances that must be examined are: 1) the interrelationship of the operations; 2) whether there is centralized control
of labor relations; 3) whether there is common management; and
4) whether there is common ownership or financial control. See,
e.g., Sakrete of Northern California, Inc., v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
902 (9th Cir. 1964).
With respect to the interrelationship of the operations, the
services that Babylon and Deer Park provide are certainly similar
In fact, the formal names of the two businesses are identical
except for the town name, namely, Babylon Glass Works, Inc. and
Deer Park Glass Works, Inc.

The 1975-1978 contract recognized

the interrelationship of the operations since the employer had
expressly reserved the right to operate a glass corporation nonunion.

Furthermore, the Babylon business card affixed to the

1978-1981 agreement (Joint Exhibit 1) states: "Babylon Glass
Works, Inc.: glass contractor, auto glass, mirrors, plate glass,
furniture tops, and store fronts.
specialist."

Arthur Boesch--mirror design

Thus the Company made a conscious effort to
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However, the Company claims that Babylon only did glass work
and Deer Park only

did mirror work.

show this separateness.

The evidence does not

Rather, the interrelationship of the

operations of both is documented by the evidence, more fully
explained later, and further confirmed by the simultaneous loss
of business that the two companies experienced.
In regard to whether there is centralized control of labor
relations, it is clear that Arthur Boesch is in charge of labor
relations for both companies.

Boesch controls hiring, transfer,

layoff, recall, work assignments, wages, hours, and benefits of
the employees.

The record is totally silent of any reference

to the control of labor relations vested in any other person.
Similarly, it is clear that Boesch is vested with complete
management control of both companies.

Boesch made decisions

concerning the use of outside contractors for both companies,
and is the president of both companies.
The record substantiated that there is common ownership
and financial control of both companies.

The companies share

a checking account, a payroll account, a workmens compensation
policy, an unemployment benefit account, and a federal employer
tax number.

The companies are located at the same address, share

an office staff and sales staff, and are controlled in every
respect by Boesch.
Based on the foregoing facts, in my judgement Babylon and
Deer Park constitute a single employer.

The question then is
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whether the employees of the companies constitute distinct and
separate bargaining units.

The key standard for determining

whether employees belong in the same bargaining unit is whether
they share a community of interest.

The record evidence indicates

that Babylon and Deer Park are functionally

integrated.

Boesch

testified that if a mirror job came in, a Babylon employee would
do the fabrication work and a Deer Park employee would do the
installation work.

The testimony also establishes that the

employees share common supervision since the only two job
classifications that are material to this case—other than
Boesch and the employees the parties stipulated were to be excluded from consideration—are the job classifications of
mechanic and helper.

Although the Babylon payroll records

(Union Exhibit 2) note that Joseph Fortier is a "foreman", this
is either inaccurate or incongruous since Fortier, who testified
as a Union witness, is the shop steward.

Thus Boesch exercised

the supervisory function over the 12 mechanics and helpers who
worked for the two companies.
With respect to the nature of the skills and functions of
the employees, the outside workers perform similar work regardless of whether they are employed by Babylon or Deer Park and
inside workers perform similar work regardless of whether they
are employed by Babylon or Deer Park.

This is evidenced by the

fact that there is significant
interchange between the employees
"
For example, Kenneth Petrie was switched from the Deer Park payroll to the Babylon payroll even though his job duties remained

-21-

the same.

Charles Schoeppe indicated that his job duties in-

cluded everything, namely, plate glass, storefronts, frames, new
fronts, reconditioning of old fronts, mirrors, and aluminum work.
Thus, even though he worked for Babylon, he did

mirrors if

there was a big job or if business was slow in his work.

Schoeppe

also testified that he saw the Deer Park mirror workers do glass
installation and storefronts on occasion.

He also knew Budds

was an all-around helper and had observed Budds do outside work
involving both mirrors and glass.

Joseph Fortier stated that

he did all kinds of work and that one year ago he did mostly
mirror work even though he was on the Babylon payroll.

Since

both companies have the same location, the employees of both
companies have significant contact with each other.

Finally,

Boesch testified that the employees receive comparable wages
and benefits and Fortier stated that the work rules are applied
without discrimination to all of the employees. Based upon the
functional integration of the companies, the common supervision,
the comparable skills and functions of the employees, the employee
interchange and contact, the common work locations, and the similar
working conditions and fringe benefits, I am persuaded that not
only are the companies a single employer, but that the employees
of Babylon and Deer Park are not distinct and separate.

Rather

they have the requisite community of interest to constitute a
single appropriate unit for collective bargaining.

I also find

by the significant change between the current contract and the
predecessor agreement regarding the "non-union shop" that the
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parties intended to apply the 1978-1981 Agreement to both
Babylon and Deer Park.

Furthermore, the placement of Kenneth

Petrie into the Union supports the Union's argument that all
employees were to be covered under the agreement.

This under-

mines the Company's position that Deer Park was beyond the reach
of the agreement and that the Union had forfeited, relinquished,
or waived its right to the Deer Park employees.

In particular,

the Company failed to establish that Union Representative Karp
had actual knowledge of the number of employees that were working
non-union.

Of equal significance is the broad jurisdiction

clause that is contained in Article II of the 1978-1981 Agreement
Due to the similar and interchangeable nature of the work that
the mechanics and helpers perform, these workers fall within the
ambit of Article II.

Therefore, the layoffs of Messrs. Budds

and Schoeppe violated the Agreement because less senior employees
of either Babylon or Deer Park continued working.
Similarly, the Company failed to notify the Union of the
employees working for Deer Park so that union dues and other
payments could be tendered.

The Company also failed to make

pension, welfare, and annuity contributions for these employees;
failed to file the required reports for the employees with the
Union; and may have failed

to pay proper wages and other benefit

to certain employees.
In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful of the Company's
contention that the Union had known about the Deer Park operation
and had acquiesced to the existence of a non-union shop.

The
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absence of the limiting clause in the 1978-1981 Agreement that
had appeared in the 1976-1978 Agreement is critical and determinative and cannot be overlooked.
terms of the current contract.

The Arbitrator is bound to the
If the Company had intended to

preserve the "independence" of Deer Park, it would not have
signed a contract that omitted and deleted its right to do so.
Accordingly I find that Babylon and Deer Park is not a valid,
double-breasted operation.
The Union also contends that the arrangement between the
Company with certain sub-contractors constitutes "a mere
subterfuge by the employer to avoid the Union's contract."

The

Union asserts that if the alleged sub-contractors are in fact
valid sub-contractors, the employer "failed to prove that the
sub-contracting arrangement was in compliance with Article XXII
of the Union's contract."
The record indicates that Babylon has utilized subcontractors for a number of years.

Specifically, Boesch

identified Richard Shaw and Imperial Jalousie as sub-contractors
he previously had used.

He also stressed the fact that he had

sub-contracted work to T & R Glass for the last 15 years.
With respect to aluminum work, I am persuaded that Babylon
has historically sub-contracted this work to outside contractors.
Standing alone the sub-contracting of aluminum work would not
violate the contract.

However, Boesch admitted that Babylon still

does window repair work for the Babylon School District but subcontracts the work to T & R Glass even though the work is billed
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through Babylon.

T & R Glass also handles one or two house

break calls each week. This type of window repair which is not
aluminum work falls within the scope of the provisions of the
Agreement and requires notice to the Union under Article XXII.
The Company argued that its relationship with Elite Mirror
is not covered by the Agreement because the work had originated
with Deer Park which the Company argued fell beyond the scope
of the collective bargaining agreement.

As I have already found

that the Agreement applies to Deer Park, the dealings between
Deer Park and Elite Mirror violate Article XXII of the Agreement.
This is underscored by the failure of the Company to establish
any evidence of previous dealings between Deer Park and Elite
Mirror.
Lastly, I am persuaded that T & R Glass and Elite Mirror
are bona fide sub-contractors.

Although the Union attempted to

establish that Boesch controls these two companies, the record
lacks support for this contention.

I note that sub-contractors

and companies that refer work to them often make special billing
arrangements.

Although Boesch suggested that sub-contractors

get insurance and in fact provided the name of an insurance agent,
the sub-contractors own their own trucks.

The limited evidence

adduced by the Union on this point is insufficient to prove the
Union's allegation.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:

-25-

For the reasons and under the circumstances
set forth in the foregoing Opinion:
The layoff of Kenneth Budds violated the
collective bargaining agreement.
The layoff of Charles Schoeppe violated the
collective bargaining agreement.
The failure to notify the Union of the hiring
of new employees violated the collective
bargaining agreement.
The failure to make pension, welfare, and
annuity contributions for "non-union" employees,
and to file the required reports violated the
collective bargaining agreement.
Any failure to pay the proper wages and benefits
as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement to "non-union" employees, violated the
collective bargaining agreement.
Consistent with their seniority and pursuant
to the relevant sections of the contract the
layoffs of Budds and Schoeppe are nullified.
They shall be made whole for wages lost due to
their layoffs less their earnings elsewhere, if
any, for the applicable period of time involved.
Pursuant to the foregoing Opinion, those "nonunion" employees who should have been included
in the bargaining unit shall be deemed placed
in the unit retroactively, and the Company shall
pay to the Union, on behalf of said employees,
the pension, welfare, and annuity contributions
required by the contract, and shall file the required reports with regard thereto.
The wage rates and other benefits provided in
the contract shall be made applicable retroactively to the "non-union" employees who should
have been part of the bargaining unit, over the
applicable period of time, pursuant to the foregoing Opinion.
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The Company is directed to notify the Union
of the hiring of new employees and is directed
to give notice to the Union of sub-contracting,
all in accordance with the terms of the contract
The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction in this case
for compliance with and implementation of this
AWARD.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 28, 1980
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-eighth day of February, 1980 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OCAWIU

Local 8-729

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 79K/05495

and
J. T. Baker Chemical Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of
grievance no. 2855?
A hearing was held in Easton, Pennsylvania on December 19,
1979 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Grievance 2855 reads:
On 9/18/78 Mgt. unilaterally changed the
breaks and lunch times of a portion of
the lig-sub dept. The Union contends that
this is a violation of the contract. See
Article and Sec. found to apply and established past practices. The Union demands
these practices cease and desist unless
otherwise negotiated with the Union.
What the Company did was to stagger the lunch and break
periods of employees in the packaging unit.

It did so primarily

to keep the operations running throughout the work day.

Previously

the employees in that unit took their lunch and breaks at the
same time, thereby necessitating the shutting down of certain
operations or the continuation of those operations at overtime pay.
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The Union contends that by unvaried past practice, changes
of this type have been bilaterally negotiated; that earlier,
when the Company sought and obtained the Union's agreement to a
change in the shift starting hours the Company made no mention
of its plan to change the lunch and break periods and the
Company is thus barred from doing so unilaterally now; and that
the Company's action violates Article 13 Section 1 of the
contract.
At the outset it should be clear that this case involves
an alleged contract breach and in no way deals with or is
determinative of any statutory obligation to bilaterally negotiate
on a mandatory subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.

Rather, what is in

dispute, and what is decided by this decision, is whether or not
the Company's unilateral changes in the lunch and break periods
was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

It is

that latter question only which falls within the jurisdiction and
authority of the Arbitrator.
The contract does not require bilateral negotiations of a
schedule or changes in the schedule of lunch periods and breaks.
The parties knew how to write contractual language requiring
bilateral negotiations of certain conditions of employment when
that was intended.

Specifically Article 11 Section 6 states in

pertinent part:
All changes of normal starting times of
any operation shall be subject to collective
bargaining.

-3Significantly, though the foregoing contract clause requires bilateral negotiation of changes in normal starting times,
there is no such contractual requirement regarding meal periods
or breaks.

It follows then that though the parties could have

required joint bargaining on changes in meal and break schedules,
they did not do so.

I must construe that omission as meaning

that the scheduling of meals and breaks has remained, contractually,
a managerial prerogative.
The Union relies on what it asserts has been a past practice
of bilateral negotiations on various schedule changes, including
presumably, prior changes of meal and break periods.

The evidence

does not show that any bilateral obligation was either involved
or resulted.

Rather, I am persuaded that in the furtherance of

good labor relations the Company consulted and discussed with
the Union various schedule changes and sought the Union's agreement.

That the Union did agree did not mean that in each in-

stance the Union's agreement was necessary for the Company to make
the change.

Based on the evidence and testimony, some of the

discussions between the parties were over changes in starting
times, and did require formal negotiations.

The others were in

the form of advice and discussions, but I do not find they constituted a waiver by the Company of its contractual right to
make changes unilaterally, in the event the Union did not agree.
Nor do I find a violation of Article 13 Section 1 of the
contract.

That provision grants overtime pay (or an equal amount

-4of time off) to an employee who is unexpectedly required to work
through through his normal lunch period.

That the newly estab-

lished staggered lunch periods reduces the opportunity for overtime under Article 13 Section 1 does not mean that that Section
has been breached.

It is well settled that this type of overtime

is not a contractual guarantee, and that an employer has the right
to take steps to minimize or eliminate overtime, so long as those
steps are consistent with the contract.

Indeed the record before

me discloses that Article 13 Section 1 is still applicable and
continues to be utilized.

The Company concedes that whenever an

employee is asked to work through his lunch period he is paid at
the rate of time and one-half, and that if the Company changes an
employee's lunch period from his normal schedule, including any
change from the present staggered schedule, it will pay him overtime for working during what had been his previously scheduled
lunch period.

It seems to me that with these two stipulations

the intentions and requirements of Article 13 Section 1 continue
to be met.

A reading of that contract provision clearly shows

that it was meant to compensate an employee for the deprivation
of a lunch period when he is asked to work through the period of
time regularly allotted for his lunch.

Under the staggered

arrangement, the employees are not deprived of a lunch period
and hence Article 13 Section 1 is not activated.

The Company is

cautioned however that excessive or chronic changes in meal and

-5lunch schedules (for example on a daily or otherwise too frequent
or unreasonable basis) would be viewed by this arbitrator as an
abuse of the management right upheld herein.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Grievance 2855 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 29, 1980
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-ninth day of January, 1980 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Federation of Telephone Workers

and

AWARD
Case #1430 0360 75 M/D

Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties make the following AWARD:
Original issues:
1. The Company is currently not in
violation of Schmertz I with respect
to the GAT and CENTREX groups.
To the extent
stated in the
the Company's
under DOC-N's
with Schmertz

and under the circumstances
Opinion of the Chairman,
present method of operating
is not presently in compliance
I.

2. In addition to the AWARD on additional
issues 1 through 3, and to the extent and
under the circumstances cited in the Opinion
of the Chairman the Company was in violation
of Schmertz I until GAT and CENTREX were
formally disbanded and for some additional
days thereafter.
3. This issue is reserved for the next
stage of this proceeding.
Additional issues:
To the extent and under the circumstances
stated in the Opinion of the Chairman
1. the Company's present method and practice of offering overtime to switchmen is
violative of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement;
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2. the Company's present use of seniority for purposes of scheduling vacation selections, scheduling tours,
transfers, and incidental layoffs of
switchmen is violative of the Collective Bargaining Agreement; and
3. the Company's present method of
determining normal reporting locations
of switchmen is violative of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

DATED: November 7, 1980

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

DATED:

William Wallace
Concurring

DATED

Gerry Voit
Dissenting
Concurring

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN

Federation of Telephone Workers
and

Case #1430 0360 75 M/D
Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania

This is the sixth arbitration proceeding arising out of
the Company's efforts to make changes in the organization of its
operations.

Indeed, throughout this arbitration it became con-

venient to refer to the three immediate prior awards and decisions
as part of a series, each bearing a number and the name of the
Chairman.

Thus, we have had Horlacher I in 1973, Horlacher II

in 1974 and Schmertz I in 1977.

Alas, after five days of hearings

over a period from June 26, 1978 to May 30, 1979, the presentation of witnesses and many documents and the submission of briefs
from both sides, and an executive session of the Board of Arbitration^we now render Schmertz II.
Except insofar as it is necessary to understand the decisions
in Schmertz II, I will not repeat the many' and complex facts which
have been presented and alluded to over

the course of the several

proceedings which preceded the instant one.

Generally, the issues

between the Company and the Union arise from the Company's reorganization of its operations purportedly in response to new
technology and the Union's claims that the operational changes
impacted on the rights of the Union and its members in a manner
which violated the collective bargaining agreement.

More par-

ticularly, but still generally, the Union has claimed that the

-2Company unilaterally instituted changes which violated the
collective bargaining agreement by virtue of their affect on
the allocation and equalization of overtime and employee rights
with respect to transfers, assignments, reporting places and
vacation.
Horlacher I, Horlacher II and Schmertz I
The opinion in Horlacher I (1973) defined what would constitute "displacement" of a central office employee by personnel
from the newly created MAC center in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Despite the absence of proof of specific

violations of the Horlacher I "displacement" rule, the arbitrator
incorporated the definition of "displacement" in the award.
Specific violations were alleged and proved in Horlacher II (1974).
The "displacement" rule was reiterated and refined and the Company
failed in its effort to persuade the arbitrator to change his
position on what constituted "displacement" (Par. 1, Horlacher
II Award).
Horlacher I and II recognized that certain employee rights,
including the allocation and equalization of overtime and some
rights of seniority were based on the geographic location of the
employee's regular assignment.

In its efforts to regroup employ-

ees from another location or another operating district such as
the MAC center or ESS district, the rights of all employees necessarily were affected.

Some would benefit and some would be

negatively impacted, but in either evert previously bargained
rights were affected without Union consent.

Horlacher II was

decided in the context of the Company's establishment of the large
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single ESS district described in that decision.

In addition to

finding the Company had violated the agreement, the Horlacher II
Award (Par. 11) provided:
The Company and the Union are directed
to negotiate whatever contract adaptations or ground rules are made necessary by the creation of the big new ESS
District. If the parties cannot reach
agreement on all matters at issue within 60 working days from the effective
date of this Award, the unresolved
issues shall be arbitrated.
Thereafter, the Union and the Company negotiated and sought
agreement on eleven items described in Union Exhibit 3 (Jt. Exh.
5, Schmertz I).

They failed to agree on items numbered 4, 5, and

6 which involved the GAT and CENTREX groups.*
issues" were arbitrated in Schmertz I.

These "unresolved

The Union claimed that

the Company's operation of those groups violated the collective
bargaining agreement and the arbitrator agreed that geographically
based rights had been affected in a manner which violated Horlacher
II.
The Schmertz I Opinion stated:
We need not remind these sophisticated
parties that arbitration awards unless
vacated or otherwise modified by appropriate court action or mutually disregarded or changed by the parties thereto, are not only final and binding, but
stand as authoritative interpretations
of the contract provisions involved.
Hence it is immaterial whether we agree

*GAT and CENTREX are described in Schmertz I.

-4or disagree with the two Horlacher
decisions on the merits or on their
interpretation of the contract.
Similarly it is not for us to determine or even consider whether Arbitrator
Horlacher and his Boards exceeded its
authority by remanding to the parties
certain issues for further negotiations
and by directing subsequent arbitration
if those direct negotiations failed.
Indeed, instead of testing the validity
of those portions of his Award, the
parties dJLd negotiate on the disputes
which Horlacher remanded to them, and
apparently reached agreement on some.
That act of compliance, together with
the effect of Article 13 and Exhibit B
of the contract, and, as previously
stated, the absence of any court action
to test the validity of those Awards,
renders them binding on the parties and
not subject to de novo review, reversal
or modification by this instant Board.
As such they stand as interpretative of
the contract regarding the reorganization
with which they dealt and which again is
the subject matter of the instant case.
The Schmertz I Award provided:
The Company's implementation of its reorganization plan in the manner which
gave rise to those Union grievances which
are the subject of Issues 4, 5 and 6 of
Joint Exhibit #5 violates the Horlacher I
and II arbitration decisions, and thereby
violates the collective bargaining agreement.
Absent mutual agreement of the parties on
some other resolution, the Company at its
option, shall either adopt and implement
the Union's proposed "Appropriate Relief"
set forth on pages 35 through the top of
page 41 of the Union's brief, or cease and
desist from implementing the reorganization
plan in the manner which gave rise to the
Union's grievance herein.
Negotiations Following Schmertz I
Following Schmertz I, rendered on November 11, 1977, the
Union and the Company entered into negotiations which sought to
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resolve the status of the GAT and CENTREX groups.

These groups

had been operating in the context of a transformed MAC center
which involved the creation of a large single ESS district.

While

the negotiations were in progress the Union was advised that the
Company was about to institute a further reorganization on
January

1, 1978 to be known as DOC-N.

Prior to January 1, 1978, there were four operating districts
in the city of Philadelphia plus the ESS district which was responsible for ESS operations in certain offices geographically
located in other central office districts.

On or about January

1, 1978, the Company began operating under its DOC-N reorganization.

The DOC-N reorganization divided the City into three oper-

ating "DOC-N" districts (District Operation Center -- Network).
The DOC-Ns also included portions of the City that had never
previously been part of the organization.
operations

Under this plan, ESS

are coordinated from a DOC-N center in each district.

The negotiations between the Union and the Company sought to resolve issues concerning the operation of the GAT and CENTREX
groups in the context of the newly created DOC-Ns.

These efforts

failed and the Company formally disbanded the GAT group on March
19, 1978, and the CENTREX group on February 5, 1978.
The Issues in Schmertz II: Three original issues and three
additional ones.
The parties agreed to return to the Board for the present
arbitration.

They stipulated the following issues at the outset

of the proceedings:

-61. Is there present compliance
with the Schmertz Award?
2. Subsequent to the Schmertz
Award, has there been any time
during which the Company was not
in compliance?
3. If the Company is not presently
in compliance, and/or if subsequent
to the Schmertz Award the Company
for a period of time was not in
compliance, to what remedy, if any,
is the Union entitled? (94-95).
During the course of the proceedings, the parties disputed
the scope of the Board's jurisdiction.

The Union claimed that

it had understood that items 1 through 3 and 7 through 11 in
Union Exhibit 3 had been resolved and that agreement had been
reached.

Upon the Company's disclaimer that those issues had

been resolved because there had not been agreement on all eleven
items, (i.e., it was a packaged deal), the Union sought to present
all of its claims of alleged Company violations of Horlacher II,
including the eight unresolved items in Union Exhibit 3 and
claimed violations under DOC-N.

The Company asserted that in

Schmertz II, only the GAT and CENTREX issues were presented by the
three original stipulated issues and consequently the Board had
no jurisdiction to determine other alleged violations of Horlacher
II in this proceeding.

The Union argued vigorously that limiting

the Board's jurisdiction to the GAT and CENTREX issues would
provide the setting for endless disputes without resolution, as
the Company imposed new organizations or renamed old ones after
each arbitration. On the fourth hearing day

the parties agreed

to expand Schmertz II to include the following three additional

-7xssues:
1. Is the Company's present method and
practices of offering overtime to switchmen violative of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
2. Is the Company's present use of seniority for purposes of scheduling vacation selections, scheduling tours, transfers, and incidental layoffs of switchmen,
violative of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement?
3. Is the Company's present method of
determining normal reporting locations
of switchmen violative of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement? (492).
It was agreed that the Board first would address the five
questions involving alleged substantive violations of the Award
and the collective bargaining agreement.

Thereafter, in a

second stage of this proceeding, the Board will address the question of remedy, if any.
Subsequent to the Schmertz Award, has
there been any time during which the
Company was not in compliance?
(Original Issue 2).
GAT and CENTREX groups: Prior to Disbandment
In Schmertz I, it was determined that the Company's manner
of operating the CENTREX and GAT groups constituted a violation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as construed
I and II.

in Horlacher

It is undisputed that GAT and CENTREX groups continued

in operation for a period of time after the Award in Schmertz I
on November 11, 1977 in the same manner as it had prior to the
Award. The Company asserts that GAT was disbanded on March 19,
1978, and that CENTREX was disbanded on February 5, 1978, but
denies that the continued operation of GAT and CENTREX during

-8these periods violated the Award.

The Company supports its pos-

ition by relying on the difficulty of immediate termination, the
fact that the parties were negotiating during this period and
the alleged failure of the Union to protest the continuance of
the groups during the negotiation." This position is rejected.
Prior to the Award in Schmertz I, the operation of the GAT and
CENTREX groups violated the contract as construed in Horlacher
II.

The operation of GAT and CENTREX without Union consent after

it was condemned by Schmertz I was a violation of Schmertz I and
a continuing violation of Horlacher II.

It is difficult to im-

agine why a formal determination of violation in Schmertz I would
be viewed as license to continue the violation until such time as
discontinuance would coincide with or meet the Company's needs or
convenience.

Of course, at this point, I am addressing the issue

of violation and not remedy, but it should be noted that if the
Company found it difficult immediately to discontinue the GAT and
CENTREX groups upon the rendering of Schmertz I, this is not because the Horlacher II or Schmertz I Awards were precipitous
events, but rather was inherent in the Company's own conduct in
failing to comply with the principles stated as early as 1973 and
1974 in Horlacher I and Horlacher II.

In short the business

needs of the Company may have a bearing on remedy, but not on
the question of contract violation.

"The
this
ning
need

Union claims that the Company had conceded violation during
period and, in effect, had told the Union the meter was runon damages. In view of the disposition of this issue, we
not resolve this fact question.

GAT and CENTREX groups: Subsequent to Disbandment
The Union argues that even if a purely formal discontinuance
of GAT and CENTREX groups took place on the dates claimed by the
Company, violation continued because GAT continued in operation
in substance until at least some time in June, 1978, and CENTREX
until on or about May 5, 1978.

It characterizes the work in end

offices of former CENTREX and GAT personnel, as well as other,
by means of personnel "loans" and Special Service units, as a
subterfuge or a sham to avoid the Schmertz I and Horlacher II
Awards.

Consequently, the Union claims the Company did not really

cease and desist from GAT and CENTREX group activities in a manner
which violated the collective bargaining agreement even if and
when those groups were formally disbanded in the manner claimed
by the Company.*
In response, the Company claims that subsequent to the
formal disbandment of GAT and CENTREX it was necessary to use
the experienced GAT and CENTREX personnel to establish some new
systems, that it had always used the "loan" method without Union
protest and that insofar as CENTREX is concerned, the work conducted by those employees in end offices was necessitated by the
need to meet a contract deadline and the unavailability of the
DOC-N office because of construction delays.

In other words,

business necessity and efficiency and not subterfuge or bad
*The Union also claims the Company is in violation of the Award
and the CBA to this day. It also claims monetary damages be
awarded commencing with the time when the GAT and CENTREX g£
were first introduced.

-10motives motivated the Company's conduct.
The essential facts are undisputed in this regard.

End

office work performable by end office personnel was performed by
non-end office personnel in a manner which violated the principles
of Horlacher II which was the basis of Schmertz I.*

There is no

need to characterize the Company's conduct as sham or subterfuge.
Conceding arguments that the Company's good faith business judgement dictated its conduct, that conduct essentially was the same
as the prior utilization of the GAT and CENTREX groups and unilaterally impacted on employee and Union rights under the collective bargaining agreement in the manner condemned by the Horlacher
II and Schmertz I Awards.

Hence, I conclude that the Company

continued in violation of Schmertz I until some time after the
Company claims GAT and CENTREX were formally discontinued.

From

the present state of the record the period of violation appears
to be until about May 5, 1978 for CENTREX and some time in June,
1978 for GAT.

Thus, the Company was in violation of Schmertz I

at some time after it was rendered.

However, precise dates of

the violation of the prior award need not be determined at this
time in order to dispose of the second of the originally
stipulated issues.

*There was some testimony that in some limited instances, some
ESS switchmen may have had and required some special training
which enabled them to perform some tasks non-ESS or local SETS
could not perform. It is not clear that this was a significantly
different situation than the one that existed prior to the award.
If there were in fact some ESS trained SETS with this additional
and necessary training and local SETS were unavailable to do the
same task, this can be taken into account in the determination
of damages in the second stage of this proceeding.

-11Is there present compliance with the Schmertz Award?
Issue 1).

(Original

The discussion on this point will also encompass the three
"additional" issues.

There is no dispute that at the time of the

proceeding the Company was no longer engaged in GAT and CENTREX.
The Union however claims that by virtue of this stipulated
issue all Company conduct that violated Horlacher II is before
the Board.

In particular, the Union sought to raise the eight

items in Union Exhibit 3 not litigated in Schmertz I.

At the

hearing, I indicated that I do not agree with the Union's contention in this regard and conclude that these other violations
of Horlacher II, if any, are not presented by original stipulated
issue 1.
The Union also claims that the Company is in violation of
the award because it implemented the DOC-N reorganization without the consent or agreement of the Union.

It is clear that the

Union has not agreed to the DOC-N reorganization nor to the guidelines concerning overtime and various aspects governed
iority under DOC-N which are in dispute.*

by sen-

The Union has stated

its claims in this regard in several ways on different occasions
during the proceeding.

On some occasions it appears to have said

that the reorganization itself could not be instituted without

*There were no incidents involving incidental layoffs hence the
applicable guidelines are uncertain. With respect to vacations,
the minutes of the April 5, 1979 meeting indicate that the Union's
apparent acceptance of vacation schedules had been under protest
and the Company expressed surprise at this revelation.
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its agreement according to the award in Schmertz I.

On other

occasions, its objection appears to be to implementing the DOC-N
reorganization without Union agreement when the reorganization
impacts on collectively bargained rights.
One possible consequence of adopting either Union position
would be that anything short of reversion to the situation existing prior to the condemned GAT and CENTREX groups under the SCC
reorganization of 1974 violates the Award in the absence of Union
assent.

On the other hand, the Company claims that it complied

with the Award by choosing the alternative permitted by the Award
that it cease and desist in the use of GAT and CENTREX groups.
The Company argues that prior to the institution of the instant
proceedings the Union had not claimed that the Award precluded
reorganization of its operations without Union agreement.
.

Further

says the Company the Award did not and could not properly impose
such a restriction on Company action.
the Company is correct.

As a matter of principle,

Neither Horlacher II nor Schmertz I

contemplated that Union assent is required to legitimatize a
reorganization of company operations, as such.

Reorganization

is not a violation per se according to Horlacher II, and Schmertz
I did not and was not intended to change that principle.

Conse-

quently, I find that the mere failure to obtain the agreement of
the Union to the DOC-N reorganization violated neither the Awards
in Horlacher II and Schmertz I nor the collective bargaining
agreement.

However, to the extent that the DOC-N reorganization

impacts on collectively bargained rights as protected by Horlacher
I and II, the Company may not act unilaterally, but must obtain

-13Union agreement with respect to the impact of those aspects of
the reorganization.

This principle was announced

and followed in Schmertz I.
lar reorganization

in Horlacher II

Indeed it is possible that a particu-

dictated and supported by good business judge-

ment may be frustrated by this requirement of Union agreement or
by the proscriptions of the prior decisions.
Original Issue #1 (continued) and the three additional stipulated
issues.
The three addit ional issues presented to the Board are
quite specific in scope despite the fact that the Union and the
Company often do not directly address the points the other has
made.

It should be noted that the fourth hearing day ended with

the understanding that the Union would present specific grievances
implicating each of these questions.

I am compelled to agree

with the Company that the Union did not fully meet this task.*
Indeed, the Union's minutes of the grievance meeting which occurred
between the fourth and fifth hearing day reflects the Union representative conceding that he did not have specific grievances to
present with respect to some of these issues.

On the other hand,

the issues themselves are stated as requiring an inquiry into
whether the "method" of equalizing overtime and reporting stations
and the "use" of seniority lists violate the collective bargaining
agreement.

^However, an examination of the grievances (Union Exhibit 34)
reveals that there are few if any factual disputes. The usual
issue under what appears to be undisputed facts is whether or not
the Company violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

-14Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement as construed by
Horlacher I and II, a number of important collectively bargained
rights are governed by geographic areas established by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The DOC-N reorganization does not

coincide with these geographic areas and attempts to agree on how
these rights would be dealt with failed.

Probably the most

significant point from the Union position is whether or not the
maintenance of separate overtime lists for ESS and non-ESS switchmen under the DOC-N reorganization violates the collective bargain
ing agreement.

The Union claims that because of the failure of

agreement on overtime with respect to the DOC-N organization, the
parties must return to ground zero, i.e., the position prior to
January, 1974, when dual overtime lists were first instituted as
part of the first Philadelphia ESS district.

The Company claims

that nothing requires placing ESS and ncn-ESS SETs on a single
overtime list in the absence of a local agreement to the contrary.
Indeed, it argues, that it would be absurd to revert to a six year
old method of allocating overtime which is ill-adapted to the
current method of operations under the newly developed technology
Both the Union and the Company rely on Horlacher I and II and the
overtime equalization
bargaining agreement.

letter which is part of the collective
The equalization letter states in relevant

part:
The Company will do its best to accomplish
equalization of overtime opportunities in
all locations under the kinds of ground
rules presently established and working
in most locations.
The key determining factor in my view is that the agreement,
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as viewed by Horlacher, creates rights which are locally and
geographically based and which can only be modified with the
Union's assent.

(Horlacher II, Un. Exhibit 2, pp.2-5).

Even

if it is true, as the Company contends, that there was a dual
overtime list in effect when the equalization letter was affirmed
in the 1974 and reaffirmed in the 1977 collective bargaining
agreements, it is not true that in light of Horlacher II, the
letter can be read as affirming commitment to the dual list without Union agreement when the circumstances of the organization
which led to its adoption have been unilaterally changed by the
Company.

When the Company reorganized in a manner which impacted

on or changed collectively bargaining rights such as overtime,
it would not be consistent with Horlacher II's construction of
the collective bargaining agreement to permit such a change without Union assent.

Hence, I find that the Company's implementation

of the dual overtime list is violative of the collective bargaining agreement whenever it is so applied as to change the rights
of any switchman who would have had different rights under whatever local overtime agreement had been negotiated for his location prior to January 1974.

It should be obvious that to hold

otherwise would permit the Company, by reorganizing, to act unilaterally with respect to this right.

Neither the passage of time

nor operation under a significantly different organization can be
deemed to permit a radical change in collectively bargained rights
unless the Union has agreed.
Union agreement on this point.

I find neither express nor implied
It should be noted, however, that

the issue is allocation or equalization of overtime at specific

-16locations.

If equalization can be accomplished while utilizing

two lists, then the Company would be in compliance.

This is a

question of fact and cannot be determined finally on the basis
of the current record.

However, the principle to be applied

is that equalization must be accomplished in accord with the
rights which existed prior to the 1974 reorganization.

And in

view of the Company's concession that it does not even attempt
to equalize overtime on that basis, the Company's current equalization practice is in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.

The extent of violation and monetary damages, if any,

are reserved for the second stage of the proceeding.
Turning to the third additional issue which questions the
present method of determining normal reporting locations in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
does not address this question in its brief.*

The Company

The Union objects

to the assignment of employees to what it characterizes in its
brief as a "fictitious DOC-N reporting location" *Union Brief, p.
33).

The Union did not present evidence of specific cases under

the DOC-N reorganization where employee reporting rights under
the collective bargaining agreement were impacted.

The two pre-

Horlacher II grievances denied by the Company and referred to in
Union Exhibit 17 do not constitute such evidence.

However, this

is not to say that the method of determining normal reporting
locations may not do violence to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement as construed in Horlacher II, where the
*The issue also is not addressed in Company Exhibit 15, which the
Company proffered as containing a list of subsidiary questions
which would resolve the stipulated issues.

-17-

arbitrator said:
One further and very obvious example
is travel time. The employees moved
into the new district have their normal
reporting location at 900 Race Street
but some employees so moved continue to
work, and regularly, at a Germantown
central office or some other end office
where they were assigned before January
6th. If one of these persons is one day
told to report for work at 900 Race Street,
he will get no travel time under Section
A5.05 regardless of whether his actual
travel time is increased or diminished.
This could hardly be the intent of Section
A5.05. The new extensive district creates
a fictitious reporting location for a number
of employees, and forstalls the purpose of
this contract provision.
The question of what should be considered the normal reporting locating for an individual employee is necessarily a fact
oriented determination with respect to each employee.

All that

can be said at this stage is that the Company cannot avoid its
financial obligations merely by designating a location as a
normal reporting location, which in the context of an individual
employee is not in fact his normal reporting location.* The normal
reporting location of an employee, according to Horlacher II,
must be his actual regular reporting location.

To the extent that

the current method of determining the normal reporting location is
not in accord with this principle, the Company is in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
Additional issue number two is phrased in terms of "use",

*The minutes of the April 5, 1979 "Grievance Meeting" indicates
Company recognition of this precept accompanied by a request for
evidence of specific impact.

-18i.e., whether the Company's current use of seniority impacts on
the rights described in the stipulated issue in a manner which
violates the collective bargaining agreement.

Except for the

Bauer case involving a frameman and not a SET, specific instances
of violation of the agreement with respect to the issues addressed
by this additional issue under the DOC-N reorganization have not
been presented.

On the other hand, there appears to be no

serious dispute that use of seniority under the new system will
not have the same effect on employees' vacation, tours, incidental layoffs and force transfers, as did the operation of the seniority under the prior single SCC district and prior to that time
as well.

While Horlacher II refused to recognize the Union's

right to veto a reorganization, it did recognize that a reorganization without the agreement of the Union concerning matters
settled by collective bargaining agreement would result in a
contract violation.

Horlacher II also announced the basic prin-

ciples underlying the construction of the collective bargaining
agreement with respect to matters then and still in dispute
(Horlacher II, pp.19-25, Union Exhibit 2).

These principles in-

clude recognition that the rights referred to in additional issue
number two are geographically based and changes in the geographic
area basis of the seniority of an employee may well affect those
rights.
Normally, in the absence of specific examples of violation
I would be inclined to conclude that a violation has not been
established.

I am generally reluctant to render what amounts to

a declaratory judgement and especially where the specifics are

-19sparse.

However, the Company does not dispute that the method

of operating under the DOC-Ns is not designed to comply with the
pre-DOC-N mode of determining seniority.

The Company, in substance,

urges that reorganization requires adjustment and modification
and that if it has the right to reorganize its business structure
it should be accorded the power to make the adjustments necessary
to permit the reorganization to be effective.
cludes recognizing
this regard.

Horlacher II pre-

that the Company has such unlimited power in

It may reorganize, but it may not affect collective-

ly bargaining rights based on seniority which in turn are based
on geographic location, without the assent of the Union.

The

Company does not deny that this may have occurred in some instances;
the Union claims it has happened but has not presented a live case
covering each of these rights.

If there are such instances, they

violate the collective bargaining agreement.
These answers to additional issues numbers 1 through 3 perforci
provide the answer to original issue number 1, namely that the
present method of operating under DOC-N's is not in compliance
with Schmertz I.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Brentwood Teacher's Association

and

AWARD
Case #1739 0314 78

Brentwood Union Free School District

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1. The School District shall in the event
of the promulgation of a new policy by
the Board of Education which may, when
implemented, offset any specific terms
and conditions within the contract agreement between the Brentwood Teachers
Association and the District, prior
consultation shall be afforded the Brentwood
Teachers Association. With respect to
the issue in this instance, the Association
shall have ten (10) days from the date
of this Decision to submit to the Board
of Education its comments relative to
this matter.
2. The School District will be governed by
Article 30, vacancies and promotions,
whenever new or established promotion
positions are vacant.
3. I recognize the standing and force of
the Sirefman Arbitration Decision (A0A.A.
Decision No. 1339 12772). However, in
those instances where there is or may be
an alleged violation of a term and condition of employment covered by the Agreement
which will not directly affect an individual
teacher, the Association will have the right
to submit an Association grievance.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: February 29, 1980
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-ninth day of February, 1980 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0019 78

and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement dated March 26, 1977 between
the above-named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute arising out of
Union grievances 76-C-100 and 77-C-3 dated October 26, 1976
and April 1, 1977 respectively.
Hearings were held at the Company offices in West Hartford,
Connecticut on June 28 and November 12, 1979 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
was duly administered.

The Arbitrator's Oath

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The aforementioned Union grievances and the Union's Demand
for Arbitration concern part numbers 101364 and 101656, and
respectively operations 292, 300, 305, 292, 294, 305 and 300.
Geievance 76-C-100 states in pertinent part:
Established bonus job being transferred to
non-bonus area (no method changed). . . .
in violation of contract Article VII, Section
14 and 15 (not confined thereto).
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The adjustment sought is:
Reestablish job in Department 87
Grievance 77-C-3 reads:
Incentive job being performed by a day
rated employee. . . .
The adjustment requested:
Remove day rate employee and put an
incentive employee on job.
In pertinent part the Union's Demand for Arbitration reads:
The Company is in violation of the above
cited contract for the following reasons:
1) The Company has unilaterally, and without the consent of the Union, removed incentive rates from certain incentive operations which are identified on the attached
list;
2) Thereafter, the Company has been paying
day rate for said operation.
The remedy sought is:
Restoration of the previously established
incentive rates to the aforesaid operation
with retroactive pay adjustment.
Though the parties did not agree on a stipulated issue, it
is clear that the Union is grieving the Company's action of
placing certain work on day rate after it had been incentivized
and worked at an incentive rate.
The essential facts are not in dispute.

The part numbers

and operations referred to in the grievances and the Demand for
Arbitration are themselves a part of the assembly of a Pratt
andVhitney fuel pump used in the F-16 fighter airplane.

The

original assembly of the disputed jobs and operations was
performed by incentive employees who were paid average earnings
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while the job was being studied.

Thereafter an incentive rate

was placed on this component phase of the assembly of the fuel
pump.

For a period of time the assembly production was per-

formed and paid for on incentive.
arose with the fuel pump.

Some operation difficulties

The Company established a new

Department (Department 75) which was specially designed for
assembly work on day rate.

When that department was ready the

assembly duties involved in this dispute were transferred to
that new department.

With that transfer this disputed work

was and has been performed in Department 75 on day rate.

The

incentive rate on the operations and parts involved remains
technically a part of Department 87 in which the work had been
performed on incentive, but none of the disputed work is any
longer performed in that department.
Again, the obvious issue is whether the Company may unilaterally transfer to day rate and to a date rate department
certain specific jobs and operations which had been incentivized
and previously worked and paid for on incentive.

The parties

recognize that there is no specific contract language covering
the issue, but there have been three prior arbitration awards
dealing with the question.
The Union relies on the December 20, 1962 Award of
Arbitrator Ralph Kharas and the July 21, 1967 Award of
Arbitrator Saul Wallen.

The Company relies on an August, 1970

Award of Arbitrator Peter Seitz.
Though the Kharas and Wallen Awards involve the Pratt and
Whitney Company, it is undisputed that the collective bargaining

-4agreement then and now covers both that employer and Chandler
Evans.

The three Awards are clear.

Mr. Kharas barred the

Company from transferring to day rate a total job

(wire-wrap)

which had previously been performed on incentive.

Mr. Wallen

stated:
"By virtue of the Award in Grievance 62-47
it is a settled construction of the contract
that the Company may not unilaterally convert
a job from incentive to day work. Professor
Kharas's decision sets forth the reason for
this holding and in Grievance 64-52 this
Arbitrator joined in his reasoning."
Following and refining the Kharas precedent, Wallen held
that the Company may not convert a job from incentive to day
work "where the segment of duties shifted constituted a significant or sizeable part of the incentive job."

In short, Kharas

barred the conversion of a whole or total operation from incentive to day work, and Wallen upheld that principle also with
regard to a significant or sizeable part of a job.
Arbitrator Seitz distinguished the case before him from
the issues decided by Kharas and Wallen.

Seitz stated:

"We only have before us the very limited assignment to day work employees of the performance
of an operation which consumes an insubstantial
portion of their internal working time." (emphasis
added)
He went on to state that he concurred with the Kharas and Wallen
decisions as applied to the facts dealt with therein, but stated
with regard to the issue before him:
"A single operation which takes up such a small
period of the internal time of a day worker is
not to be equated with the fact situations dealt
with by Wallen and Kharas."
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Seitz held that a single operation, accounting for a small
portion of an employees time, or a limited assignment which
consumes an insubstantial portion of an employee's working
time, could be shifted from incentive to day rate.
I concur with all three decisions.

I find that each deals

with facts and circumstances different from the others, and
that the instant case before me involves facts that are again
different and distinguishable.

Based on the record I am not

prepared to conclude that the assembly work involved in the
instant disputed part numbers and operations are of a single,
or limited nature, or that they require only a small or inconsequential amount of an employee's working time within the
meaning of the Seitz Award.

On the other hand it is undisputed

that the instant disputed work is only itself one part of the
assembly of the fuel pump, and therefore it is not a full or
total job within the meaning of the Kharas decision.

Also

whether it is a substantial or significant part of the overall
fuel pump assembly is to my mind unclear in this record.

What

is clear is that it is an integral and essential part of the
fuel pump, but obviously that is true for each and every component
of that piece of machinery.
I have concluded that within the frame of the Kharas, Wallen
and Seitz decisions, which remain enforceable interpretations
of the contract inasmuch as since their rendition the parties
have not negotiated any material contract changes or any provisions which would negate or modify those decisions, a fourth

-6and further particularized Award is needed to meet the facts
and circumstances of the instant case.

It is noted that

Arbitrator Seitz confined his decision to the "very special
facts" of the case before him.

That reservation is equally

applicable to my decision herein.
My view is that absent circumstances which fall within the
Kharas and Wallen holdings, and again in the absence of any
explicit contract limitation, the Company has the right to
switch certain job operations that are part of a larger, total
job, from incentive to day rate without the Union's consent,
provided the Company has an important and legitimate business
reason for doing so.

(To reduce payment to its employees for

the work performed is not an important and legitimate business
reason for making such a switch.)

In this case, had the Company

shown that the operating difficulties experienced with the fuel
pump were reasonably attributable to the fact that certain parts
of the pump were assembled on incentive, I would have held that
that was an important and legitimate business need for switching
the job from incentive to day rate.

In other words if quality

of work so critical to the fuel pump of a fighter plane, was
jeopardized by an emphasis on quantity and speed in its assembly,
I would hold that the Company had the right to remove the work
from incentive.
in this case.

However the Company has not made that connection
It does not say, nor can it show that the assembly

of the disputed parts and operations on incentive had anything
to do with the working difficulties of the fuel pump.

That

being so the Company has neither alleged nor shown an important

-7or legitimate business need jus tifying the removal of the job
from incentive.
Nor can the Company rely on its establishment of the day
rate Department 75.
begs the question.

The argument in that connection simply
Just because the work has been transferred

to what the Company identifies as a day rate department does not
mean that deincentivization
the work to that department.

automatically

follows by transferring

To allow the Company to do so

would give the Company the unrestricted opportunity to circumcent the Kharas and Wallen Awards by simply establishing day
rate departments and then transferring incentive jobs into those
departments.

Manifestly the Kharas and Wallen Awards may not

be unilaterally nullified that way.

Accordingly, that the in-

stant disputed jobs were transferred by the Company to a new day
rate department, is immaterial to the question of whether and
when the Company may switch an incentive job or operation to day
rate.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties makes the following
AWARD:
Union Grievances 77-C-100 and 77-C-3, as
merged into and codified by the Union's
Demand for Arbitration dated January 6,
1978, are granted. Part numbers 101364
and 101656, and Operations 292, 294, 300
and 305 shall be restored to their previous
incentive rates, regardless of whether the
work is performed in Department 87, or 75
or elsewhere in the plant. No monetary

-8-

damages were shown so no retroactive
monetary adjustments are directed.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
May 24, 1980

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0416 79

and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

In accordance with Article V of the collective bargaining
agreement dated March 26, 1977 between the above named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide a dispute involving disciplinary layoffs of
two days imposed on eleven identified employees.
A hearing was held at the Company plant in West Hartford,
Connecticut on March 26, 1980 at which time representatives of
the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was duly administered.

The

parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The parties could not agree on a stipulated issue.

The

Arbitrator was authorized to determine the issue in dispute.
Based on the record it is apparent and I so determine, that
the issue is:
Was there just cause for the disciplinary
layoffs on June 4 and 5, 1979 of the eleven
identified employees?
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The issue is answered

in the affirmative.

I find that the

eleven identified employees, hereinafter referred to as the
grievants, violated Article VI of the contract by engaging in
a work stoppage and interruption of production on June 2, 1979.
Around 7:08 to 7:10 AM, after they had commenced their
regular work shift, and at a time when they were scheduled to
be working, the grievants, virtually simultaneously, left their
work positions in Department 214, proceeded to an area near the time
clock and stood around there as a group.

It is basically un-

disputed that they did so because they objected to the Company's
assignment on that day and at that time of overtime work in
Department 214 to three other employees from another department.
It is also undisputed that a previous similar assignment of
overtime work in Department 214 to employees from other departments was the subject of a pending grievance at the time of this
instant incident.

I find, based on

the virtually

simultaneous

action of the grievants, together with certain statements made by
some of them at the time that they left their work stations, that
their action was not only concerted but that it was a planned
demonstration to protest the Company's assignment of overtime in
Department 214 to three employees who were not regularly members
of that department.

As such I conclude that it was an impermiss-

able stoppage of work and interruption in production in violation
of Section 1 of Article VI of the contract which provides in

-3pertinent part:
The Union agrees that there will be no
strike, slowdown, stoppage of work or
interruption of production...until all
methods herein provided for settling
grievances shall have been exhausted.
It is obvious that because the underlying dispute was pending as a grievance and because the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract were available not only to resolve
that pending grievance but also to receive and resolve another
manifestation of the same dispute which arose on June 2nd, the
contract methods for settling grievances had not been exhausted.
Section 2 of Article VI reads in pertinent part:
Employees who participate in such an
interruption in production may be
subject to disciplinary action up to and
including discharge.
Under the foregoing, the two day disciplinary layoff imposed on
each of the grievants was proper.
I reject the Union's defense that because the grievants were
working voluntary overtime on Saturday, June 2nd they were free
to leave their jobs at any time during their scheduled work hours
with impunity.

Assuming arguendo that that Saturday work schedule

was "voluntary overtime" and the employees had the right to
decline such work assignments, once they were scheduled for and
accepted and/or commenced their work shifts, all of the provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement obtained and were enforceable, including the "no strike" clause and the grievance and
arbitration provisions.

Therefore, if a work dispute arose, the

grievance (and arbitration) provision of the contract was the

-4exclusive means for its resolution, and self help in the form of
a concerted leaving of work stations during regular working time,
or any other stoppage or interruption

in production, was pro-

hibited.
I also reject the Union's assertion that the grievants
merely grouped together away from their work places in order to
discuss their objection to what the Company had done and to seek
a shop steward or Union official to counsel them.

I do not find

that the dispute or disagreement was so compelling that it could
not have been discussed with a shop steward sometime later, during a work break or when the shift ended.

Because the grievance

and arbitration provisions of the contract are capable of providin
a complete and adequate remedy, a grievance filed later in the
day during a break in regular working time could provide a full
remedy for the grievants, if they were contractually correct in
their objections.

A demonstration in the form of a group depart-

ure from work stations, was not necessary.

Nor, for reasons

already indicated, am I persuaded that what the grievants did was
merely a spontaneous, emotional reaction to seeing three employees
from another department working in Department 214 on that overtime day.

Considering the fact that a grievance covering this

substantive dispute was pending at the time, the issue between
the grievants (and the Union on their behalf) and the Company
had already been joined by the filing of a prior formal grievance.
So what took place on June 2nd was not a new matter to the
grievants and hence I do not interpret their action as spontaneous,
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coincidental or simply an emotional response.
Finally I conclude that I need not determine what Supervisors
Rustaad and Olender said to the grievants while they stood around
the time clock.

Whether the grievants were ordered out of the

plant and did not clock out until ordered to leave, or were told
to carry on their conversation in the parking lot because some
of them stated they had already clocked out, is immaterial.

The

Union's defense that the grievants left the plant because they
were ordered to do so and that any failure to comply with that
order would constitute insubordination, begs the issue.

The fact

is that the work stoppage or interruption in production did not
take place when the grievants left the plant, but rather occurred
when they left their work places during their regular working
time, and grouped at or near the time clock.

In short, the

interruption in production in violation of Article VI of the
contract took place a few'.minutes after 7 AM when they walked
away from their work stations and continued to and through the
period of time that they
' congregated in the area of the time clock,
Because the Article VI contract violation had been committed before
the grievants left the plant, the circumstances causing them to
leave are of no consequence, and the disputed testimony on that
point need not be resolved.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes
the following AWARD:

-6-

The disciplinary layoffs on June 4 and
5, 1979 imposed by the Company on Martha
Chapados, Delias Desmarais, Mary Ann
Martin, Helen Anderson, Edna Walker,
Stephan Guillmette, Iva White, Mary Perry,
Thelma Macon, Sonia Kohun and Louise Eshia
were for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
June 10, 1980

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION -AND- CITY OF NEW YORK
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A - 929-79

and
The City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
When under circumstances complained of by
the Union, the Department details a fireman from the unit to which he is permanently
assigned to another unit after the start of
his tour, and when the Department directs
him to return to his permanent unit from the
unit to which he was detailed within his
regular tour of duty, is either or both a
circumvention of Article XXVI of the contract
and/or a circumvention of PAID 16-72 revised,
as amended, and PAID 5-74 revised? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 13, 1979 at which time
representatives of the Union and City appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The only incidents and examples presented by the Union in
this case were those in which a fireman was detailed from the
unit

to

which he was permanently assigned to another unit after

the start of his tour and returned to his original unit before
the end of his tour, when at the beginning of his tour and when
he was detailed all relevant companies were fully manned pursuant

-2to the manning requirements of the contract.
Under that and those circumstances the City did not agree
to, nor does the contract require, the payment of "portal to
portal" pay, nor under that and those circumstances did the
City relinquish its managerial right to order such details.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The foregoing stipulated issue is answered
in the negative. The Union's grievance is
denied.

DATED: April 14, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

On this fourteenth day of April, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
AND
CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
Between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-830-79
A-840-79

and
City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
Assuming that the result is a reduction
in minimum manning, has the Department
violated or would the Department be in
violation of the collective bargaining
agreement if it assigned or assigns firemen to operate departmental vans and/or
spare passenger type cars for transportation of firefighting apparatus and equipment, delivery of payrolls, and transportation of departmental personnel or other
persons.
If so, the Impartial Chairman retains
jurisdiction over the question of whether
there was or would be a reduction in minimum
manning, and if so, what remedies (if any)
shall be awarded retroactively and/or prospectively. The rights of the parties on
those questions are expressly reserved for
subsequent hearings.
Hearings were held on October 10 and December 13, 1979 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

,/

The Arbitrator's
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The Union particularized its original grievance in a
letter dated June 18, 1979 setting forth those situations which
it claims are or would be contract violations within the meaning
of the aforementioned stipulated issue.

As recited in that

letter those situations are:
1. Messenger Duty. Department Vans and Spare Chiefs'
Cars are regularly used for messenger duty between command
locations and firehouses reducing minimum manning. In par^
ticular, non-emergency messages including Department orders
and directives are routinely carried between divisional headquarters and between divisional headquarters and borough command
headquarters.
2. Transportation of Non-Firefighting Equipment.
Department vehicles are routinely used to transport non-firefighting equipment, reducing minimum manning, between various
locations, including firehouses, borough and divisional headquarters and repair shops, reducing minimum manning even though
no emergency requires such use.
3. Transportation of Firefighting Apparatus and Equipment.
Vehicles are routinely used to transport firefighting apparatus
or equipment, reducing minimum manning, when no emergency exists.
Items of firefighting equipment requiring immediate repair or
replacement as a result of loss or damage during a tour are not
included in this category. However, scheduled inspection,
maintenance, repair or replacement on a regular basis, particularly where items are accumulated until a certain number of items
are available or until a particular date is reached are included
in this category. Examples of this category are movement of
spare apparatus to and from Department shops, and accumulation
of radios for repair on a regular scheduled basis.
4. Delivery of Department Forms, Records, or Regular
Payrolls. Transportation of Department records, forms and
regular payrolls among command headquarters or to firehouses,
reducing minimum manning, where no emergency exists, is routine.
5. Transportation of Personnel. The Department routinely
transports Department personnel and other persons, reducing
minimum manning, when no emergency exists, particularly to avoid
accrual of overtime.

-3In the course of the hearings the City acknowledged and
stipulated that under the following circumstances situations no.
1. and no. 2. above were or would be contract violations, and that
the same is true with regard to that portion of situation no. 4.
relating to "Department forms and records.":
1. Messenger Duty. Except when an emergency requires
otherwise, all transportation and delivery of messages, letters,
memoranda, circulars, directives, etc. to or from divisional
headquarters, borough command headquarters, Fire Department
headquarters, and between any of the above and firehouses.
2. Transportation of Non-firefighting Equipment. All
transportation or delivery of non-firefighting equipment including,
but not limited to, furniture, office equipment, supplies, and nonfirefighting tools to or from any location, including division
headquarters, borough command headquarters, Fire Department headquarters, and firehouses.
4. Transportation of Department Forms and Records. All
transportation and deliveries of Department forms and records to
or from division headquarters, borough command headquarters or
Fire Department headquarters, and between any of the above and
firehouses, or between firehouses.
The City stated that violations within the meaning of
situations no. 1, 2 and that portion of no. 4 above cited would
be discontinued and/or would not occur prospectively.
Regarding situation no. 3 the Union objects to any reductior
in minimum manning of a company in service by the moving of broker
down apparatus to the repair shop, the "jockeying" of vehicles
from one location to another until the repair shop is capable of
receiving those vehicles, and the return of the apparatus from
the repair shop.

It does not object to the obtaining of spare

apparatus by personnel of a company that is out of service due
to an apparatus breakdown while that company is out of service.

-4As to "equipment" under situation no. 3 the Union excludes
"vital and unique tools," such as power saws, generators and
Hurst tools, essential to firefighting duties which require
immediate replacement.
circumstance an

The Union stipulated that in that

"emergency" exists within the meaning of

Attachment A of the contract, and that a reduction in manning
to obtain and deliver those tools would not violate the contract.
What the Union complains about, as set forth under situation
no. 3 in the aforementioned letter, is the routine collection,
replacement, repair, maintenance and other similar work in
connection with regular firefighting equipment.

As an example

the Union cites the regularly scheduled program of repairing and
replacing handi talkies, radios and spare pieces of equipment
which at present are transported in the types of vehicles referred to in the stipulated issue with consequent reductions in
the manning of regular firefighting companies.
In view of the City's acknowledgement and stipulation,
the only disputed item remaining in situation no. 4 is the
delivery of "regular payrolls."

It is regular procedure for the

payroll to be delivered to each Division before 6:00 p.m. each
Thursday.
Under situation no. 5 the Union does not include nor does
it object to the use of the stipulated vehicles and a consequent
reduction in manning to relieve firemen at fires, or when a
fireman has suffered a serious injury at a fire and requires
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emergency transportation for treatment (even though the Union
believes an ambulance should be available for that purpose).
Rather it objects to the routine movement of uniformed personnel
for foreseeable or planned reasons, such as interviews, the
transportation of firemen from fires with non-serious

injuries,

when ambulances should be used, and the tranportation of nondepartmental personnel such as official visitors from Washington
or elsewhere (e.g. picked up at the airport) when no limited
service firemen ordinarily assigned to that latter work are
available.
The applicable constrod: section is Attachment A Department
Order which reads:
TO: All Officers
FROM: Chief of Department
RE: Use of Department Vans and Spare Chiefs' Cars
I continue to receive reports that manning is being
reduced below minimum levels by assignments of firement to
operate Department Vans and Spare Chiefs' Cars for non-emergency
duties and for duties which do not result from conditions beyond
the control of the Department.
You have been advised that such assignments violate the
collective bargaining agreement, Department rules and regulations
and Department policy. Further assignments of this nature will
not be tolerated.
Your attention is directed to Article XXVII Section 7 of
the collective bargaining agreement which exempts the Department
fromminimum manning requirements only where a vacancy occurs
during a tour due to an emergency or due to conditions beyond
the control of the Department. In all other cases minimum
manning requirements must be strictly observed. Routine matters
are not emergencies. It is not permissible to let routine matters
accumulate until they become emergencies.
In the event an assignment inconsistent with this order is

-6brought to my attention, appropriate measures will be taken by
the Department against the officer making such assignment.
Based on the foregoing contract language, the issue narrows
to whether each or any of the foregoing disputed situations
constitute an "emergency" or are "due to conditions beyond the
control of the Department."

It is noted that in bold type

Attachment A states that:
Route matters are not emergencies.
Based on the record before me and my knowledge of the
operational circumstances involved in each of the disputed
situations, 1 conclude that none of those complained of or
objected to herein by the Union is an emergency or meets the
test of circumstances beyond the Department's control. Each is
either a routine function about which the Department has adequate
experience, notice and knowledge, or is a development which does
not require immediate or emergency attention but rather can be
delayed a reasonable period of time and handled routinely.

It is

fully recognized that all of this work and these activities are
a necessary part of the Department's firefighting function.

But

none of them reach the level of an"emergency" within the traditional
meaning of that word or within its contractual meaning.

There-

fore if minimum manning is reduced by the use of Department vans
and/or spare passenger type cars to carry out those activities,
the minimum manning requirements of the contract and Attachment
A are violated.
Disputes over whether particular functions fall within

-7the foregoing Decision, shall be submitted to me for case by
case determination.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 11, 1980
STATE OF New York ).ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eleventh day of February, 1980, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmerts to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
APTA District Council 47, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1430 1108 795

and
City of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Union's grievance on behalf of Dr.
Arthur B. Lee arbitrable?
A hearing was held in the Philadelphia offices of the
American Arbitration Association on March 12, 1980 at which
time representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The basis of the Employer's challenge to the arbitrability
of the grievance is the acknowledged fact that the Union initiated
the grievance at the fourth step, unilaterally bypassing the
earlier steps of the grievance procedure.
Absent the special circumstance of this case, this Arbitrator
would hold that he is bound to the bilaterally negotiated provisions of the contract and would require the Union to follow all
the sequential steps of the grievance procedure, unless by the
joint agreement the parties arranged for the handling of the
grievance differently.

The purpose of such traditional view of
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course, is to afford full opportunity at each step of the grievance
procedure for ample discussion of the problem, for full disclosure
of all of the relevant information, and most importantly for
attempts at resolution of the dispute at levels closest to where
the problem arose and before the adverse positions of the parties
harden.
However these principles are not present in the instant
case, and the circumstances are such as to make preeminent the
well settled legal axiom that a party need not be required to
undertake or exhaust a useless act.

Here it is undisputed that

the decision which gave rise to the grievance, namely the level
of pay for Doctor Lee, was made by the Employer's central personnel
office and not by the Department or the levels of the Department
represented by departmental officials at Steps I through III of
the grievance procedure.

It is Step IV of that procedure which

would involve for the first time management officials from and
representing the Employer's central personnel office where the
policy decision regarding the grievant's salary level was made.
I am persuaded, based on the testimony, that while departmental officials at Steps I through III had the authority to
correct ministerial errors, they had no authority, in dealing with
the issue of the grievant's pay level on a substantive basis, to
make any changes in the policy decision which led to this dispute.
Therefore it is clear that no discussions at the Steps prior to
Step IV could have produced a change in the Employer's position
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regarding the grievant's salary, and the grievance could not have
been adjusted in any manner satisfactory to the Union during or
at those Steps.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Employer
should be entitled to demonstrate to the Union in the earlier
grievance steps that the Union's grievance lacked merit; that
the Union should drop it; that that opportunity is also a
significant and reciprocal purpose of the grievance procedure;
and that in this case the Employer was not given that opportunity.
I agree with the Employer's argument that the latter are
legitimate and meaningful purposes of the grievance procedure,
but again, I do not find those factors to be realistically
applicable here.

Inasmuch as the policy decision regarding Dr.

Lee's salary was made at the Employer's central personnel office,
and not within the Department for which the grievant works, I
am not persuaded that representatives at the departmental level
are or were in a position to freely deal with the substantive
aspects of that policy, other than to implement and defend it.
They could explain it, but because they were not party to its
formulation, I doubt they could justify it to the extent that the
Union would be persuaded that the grievance lacked merit and
should be abandoned.

Indeed, under those conditions, the dis-

agreement between the parties, rather than being subject to
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potential amelioration, might well have been exacerbated.

For

if the departmental representative at Steps I through III were
in no position to change the Union's mind, the Employer's representatives at the Step IV level might well feel more compelled to
support and affirm the position of the managerial representatives
below, rather than deal with the issue ab initio at the level
where the problem arose.

Put another way, I conclude that the

Employer representatives who would handle the grievance in the
earlier steps were not in a policy position to persuade the Union
of their belief that the grievance lacked merit any more than the
Union at those levels could have convinced the Employer to change
its decision regarding Dr. Lee's salary.
To my mind therefore, under the particular circumstances of
this case and limited to this case alone, the futility of the
grievance steps prior to Step IV is apparent.

Therefore I am not

disposed to foreclose this grievance from any adjudication on its
merits.

Accordingly the grievance is arbitrable and not barred

from arbitration because Steps I through III of the grievance
procedure were not utilized.
The Union should carefully note however that because this
ruling is limited to this situation it may not be construed as a
license to file other grievances in or at later steps of the
grievance procedure or to unilaterally bypass any of those steps.
Other situations may well be different, where utilization of all
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the grievance steps may be useful and consistent with the purpose
and intent of that procedure, and, in subsequent cases, other
arbitrators who may feel strictly bound to the contract steps,
may require precise compliance under any and all circumstances.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of Dr. Arthur
B. Lee is arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 14, 1980

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
APTA, District Council 47

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1108 79 J

and

City of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the City was entitled to
recover money from Dr. Arthur Lee's salary? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 29, 1980 at
which time Dr. Lee, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the above named Union and City appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant has a sincere and equitable case which, however,
is preempted by civil service law.
I find that when the grievant was transferred from the
Philadelphia General Hospital to the Medical Service of the prison
system he had reasonable grounds to believe that he had moved at
least laterally in professional rank and that his official status
at the latter location would be that of a Physician II.

At the

Philadelphia General Hospital he was a Receiving Ward Physician,,
He went to the prison system and was assigned and performed the
duties previously performed by the Director of Medical Services
(who at the time was seriously ill) and was regarded as the "Acting
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Director."

In terms of status and responsibility, I would judge

that the Acting Director of Medical Services of the prison system
was no less than that of a Receiving Ward Physician, and I can
appreciate why the grievant believed his transfer was at least
lateral.
Also the grievant testified that when he was interviewed for
the prison job by representatives of the City he was told by a
Mr0 Pisicano that he would be slotted in the civil service classification of Physician II at the prison system and that the pay of
a Receiving Ward Physician and Physician II were equivalent.
Pisicano did not testify at the arbitration hearing.

Mr.

On that basis,

and in the absence of contravening testimony by Mr. Pisicano, I
can understand why the grievant believed that his transfer was at
least lateral.
Moreover the grievant testified, again unrefuted, that he
initiated his transfer from the Philadelphia General Hospital to
the prison system by filing an application for the latter assignment.

He did so in May of 1977, at least a month before the

Philadelphia General Hospital closed.

In that regard I think the

grievant had reason to believe that he was not among those transferred from the Philadelphia General Hospital because it closed,
but rather that his transfer, prompted by his own initiative did
not put him in the category of employees covered by Section 31.23
of the civil service law.
The grievant's reasonable belief that he was accorded and
occupied the Physician II classification at the prison system is
evidenced by the original handwritten notation "Physician II" in

-3the upper left hand corner of the Application For Employment which
he filled out for the transfer.

I accept as t^ruthful his state-

ment that he was later surprised when he saw that the "II" of that
written notation had been subsequently colored in with a felt pen
by a city personnel representative thereby changing it to "I" on
that application

(i.e. a change from

"Physician II" to "Physi-

cian I") .
The Union has not cited nor do I find any provision in the
collective bargaining agreement covering this situation.

The City

argues that what is applicable is Section 31.23 of the civil service
law which reads:
PHILADELPHIA GENERAL HOSPITAL PERSONNEL.
Employees of Philadelphia General Hospital
who are transferred as a result of that unit's
closing to a classification with a lower pay
range shall retain their current annual rate
but shall receive no further increase in pay
until their annual rate falls within the range
for the class to which they are assigned.
In the absence of an applicable provision in the contract,
the Arbitrator should not ignore external law if that law is
applicable.

I find that despite the grievant's legitimate beliefs

as to his status at the prison system, the foregoing civil service
law is applicable to his situation and is controlling.
Though the grievant may have initiated his request for transfer, I must conclude that it was because he knew that the Philadelphia General Hospital would soon be closed and as a consequence
he sought placement elsewhere in City employment.

Based on the

testimony of City witnesses, I conclude that the grievant was
considered and treated as an employee who was transferred or
sought transfer as a result of the planned closing of the Philadelphia

-4General Hospital within the meaning of Section 31.23 of the civil
service law.
It is unrefuted testimony of City witnesses that the only
available medical positions at the prison system at the time of
the grievant's transfer, and the only positions for which there
was a line budget were in the Physician I classification.

In other

words despite the grievant's "desk" assignment as the Acting
Medical Director, and despite his performance of duties that were
the same or similar to those previously performed by the Medical
Director who was on sick leave, the only official job available
to which a salary was attached and for which funds were budgeted
was that of Physician I.

I find that technically and officially

the City gave the grievant the only civil service title available
for which funds were available, and that job was as a Physician I.
(And that accounts for the felt pen change on the Application For
Employment).
Under Section 31.23 of the civil service law covered employees
shall retain their current annual rate but
shall receive no further increase in pay
until their annual rate falls within the range
for the class to which they are assigned.
Classified as a Physician I, the grievant occupied a classification with a lower pay range than what he received as a Receiving
Ward Physician.

When transferred to the prison system he retained,

"red circled", the salary which he was paid previously.

Under

Section 31.23 he should not have received the general contract
wage increase of approximately $2500 on July 1, 1978.

Instead,

under that statutory provision his red circled salary of $35,991
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should have remained unincreased until the wage increases under
the collective bargaining agreement brought the salary of a
Physician I into that range.
It appears to me that as a classified Physician I performing
the duties of the Acting Medical Director of the prisons, the
grievant may have been working out of title in a higher rated job
assignment.

I am not familiar with the civil service law of the

City of Philadelphia (or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) but if
under that law the grievant has a cause of action for higher pay
because he performed the duties of a higher job, his right to make
that claim and pursue that cause of action before the Civil Service
Commission, in the courts, or in any other forum with jurisdiction,
is expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
On statutory grounds, and in the absence of
any explicit contrary contract provisions,
the City was entitled to recover money from
Dr. Arthur Lee's salary.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 14, 1980

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
AFGE Local 1760

AWARD ON ARBITRABILITY
Case No. 79K/27196

and

Department of Health, Education
and Welfare

The threshold question presented at the hearing on January
17, 1980 is whether the Union's grievance on behalf of Vera
Grayson is arbitrable.
The Employer contends that the Union failed to meet the
time limit set forth in Article 29 Section b of the contract.
That Section reads:
Within 5 workdays from the date of the
request for arbitration, the parties
shall jointly request from the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service a
list of five impartial persons qualified
to act as arbitrators.
It is undisputed that the Union gave written notice to the
Employer of its intents to arbitrate the grievance by memorandum
dated September 10, 1979.

However the Union did not present the

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Request For Arbitration
Panel to the Employer for joint request of a list of arbitrators
until September 24, 1979.

The Employer's position is that because

more than five workdays elapsed between the date of the request
for arbitration and the submission of the FMCS form, the Union
failed to comply with the Article 29 Section b time limit, and
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that the dispute is now time barred from arbitration.
Based on the testimony and evidence I am satisfied that
the Union constructively, and therefore adequately, complied with
the procedures and time limits of Sections a and b of Article 29;
that under the particular circumstances of this case the Employer
had timely notice of the Union's intent to submit the grievance
to arbitration; and that the Employer was not prejudiced by the
few days delay.
The evidence shows that the local Union president was away
between September 10 and September 17.

There is evidence that

within that period of time the Union's vice-president inquired
of an authorized representative of the Employer about processing
the case to the FMCS.

There is also evidence that on September

17th, the last day within the five workday period, the Union
delivered another written communication to the Employer inquiring
further about the processing of this grievance to arbitration.
I do not dispute the Employer's statement that it did not
receive and has no record of the September 17th written communication.

However I am not prepared to disbelieve the Union's

testimony that that communication was delivered on that date to
the appropriate office of the Employer.
tion was introduced into evidence.

A copy of that communica-

It is coneivable that that

particular communication was overlooked or went astray.
that circumstance

the September 17th communication

Under

could be

construed as a reiteration of the September 10th notice with a

-3new 5 workday period running from the 17th.

Alternatively, I

conclude that as of September 17th the Union had reasonable
grounds to believe that the Employer was again officially informed
of the Union's intent to arbitrate the grievance and to its
readiness to select an arbitrator for that purpose.

The Union's

failure to submit the FMCS form to the Employer between September
10th and September 17th (as apparently has been the practice in
previous matters) was, in my judgement, a ministerial error, which,
in view of the September 10th notice and my findings in connection
with the September 17th communication, shall not be deemed fatal
to an adjudication of the grievance on the merits.

By September

24th, and with no apparent prejudice to the Employer, the FMCS
form was submitted.
For the foregoing reasons and limited to the particular
circumstances of this case, the Union's grievance on behalf of
Vera Grayson is arbitrable.

DATED: April 14, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

On this fourteenth day of April, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

